From the USG Open Source Center, a translation of an interview with Iraq's intelligence head:
' Iraqi Intelligence Chief Al-Shahwani Warns of Danger of Partisan PoliticsInterview with Iraqi Intelligence Service chief Major General Muhammad al-Shahwani by Sa'd Abbas; place and date not given: "There Will Be Security in the Country When the Political Parties Stop Undermining the Authority of the Prime Minister"
Al-Zaman
Tuesday, June 20, 2006 T16:37:56ZDocument Type: OSC Translated Text
(Abbas) How far has the intelligence service gone in terms of qualitative preparedness?(Al-Shahwani) One can say that Iraq at present possesses a professional intelligence service. The intelligence service is much better and more advanced than its predecessor under the former regime, technically and in terms of national loyalty. However, in view of the abnormal security situation in the country, the intelligence service does not practice its duties in many fields outside Iraq, as it is supposed to do. The country's circumstances require the intelligence service to focus its activity inside the country, yet it has had a presence in some fields in some of the neighboring countries. So far, we have not been able to work in more distant areas, such as Europe and other countries.
(Abbas) It is well known that intelligence activities are supposed to be conducted in an environment outside the country. How can you achieve your objectives, if your activities are restricted to inside the country?
(Al-Shahwani) The factors I just mentioned have forced us to stay away from distant areas. At present, and in view of current circumstances, our main concern is to focus on Iraq's domestic security and on contributing to solving the many faults and obstacles in the new Iraqi security experiment. In addition, we have to coordinate our efforts with all security organs of the state in fighting terrorism. We must put an end to incidents of border infiltration and penetration. We must contain violence by consolidating the domestic security front. We must enhance security and stability and uphold the rule of law. Despite all that, the intelligence service is implementing a phased plan to start its activities in foreign arenas outside the country.
(Abbas) There are widespread claims about the lack of coordination between various Iraqi security forces. There is also a kind of recrimination between these forces to justify the inefficiency of the joint security committee. Moreover, some say that the intelligence service has its own agenda and is working independently. How do you comment on that?
(Al-Shahwani) Let me tell you clearly and frankly. As is the case with all other security forces in the country, the intelligence service works under the authority of the state. Ever since it was established in April 2004, the intelligence service has never been engaged in any kind of activity that contradicts this constitutional description. The head of the service has the rank of minister, and therefore, I used to attend cabinet meetings under the provisional government of Dr Allawi. I used to submit regular reports to the prime minister, as did other ministers in the government. According to this hierarchy, we all have to report to the prime minister. Therefore, it is not true in theory and in practice to say that we are working independently.
(Abbas) How did this situation develop under the transitional government of Dr Ibrahim al-Ja'fari?
(Al-Shahwani) Unfortunately, our role was marginalized. We were not invited to attend cabinet meetings. They felt it was sufficient that we sent our reports regularly. This made it impossible for us to know what was going on in the meetings. Moreover, it helped spread rumors that would harm the government and the intelligence service at the same time.
(Abbas) Do you mean that the intelligence service was completely denied the opportunity to attend cabinet meetings?
(Al-Shahwani) Not completely. The service was invited to attend the meetings of deputy ministers. In other words, I did not attend any cabinet meeting, but my deputy used to attend the meetings of deputy ministers.
(Abbas) How did this marginalization affect the work of the service?
(Al-Shahwani) In our work, we cannot procrastinate or refrain from doing our job for any reason. The service continued to practice its duties efficiently and professionally. Regular reports were sent to the president, the prime minister, the head of the Security and Defense Committee in the former National Assembly, the defense minister, the interior minister, the foreign minister, the state minister for national security affairs, and the national security adviser. The channels of coordination are still open at the highest levels of professionalism between the service and all security committees. We are members of 24 security committees. These include the ministerial committee for national security, the ministerial committee for national security at the level of deputies, the joint planning committee, the national intelligence council, the national committee for joint intelligence analysis, the elections security committee, the executive committee for the integration and transformation of the militias, and many others. On the other hand, since its establishment, the intelligence service has contributed and still is contributing to pursuing and uncovering terrorist elements. For example, last year we helped the relevant authorities arrest a number of these elements after providing information about them. The service also contributed last year to the discovery and prevention of 245 terrorist operations before they were executed. These operations included explosives belts, which were aimed at government offices, members of the armed forces, and the police. In addition, the service contributed to the discovery of a number of infiltrators who were trying to enter Iraq from the neighboring countries. We also uncovered the methods they used to enter Iraq to execute their terrorist plans. We contributed to 409 joint missions with explosives experts from other security forces and managed to defuse car bombs and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This included defusing 133 vehicles in coordination with Interior Ministry staff.
(Abbas) Are there any other examples of this coordination?
(Al-Shahwani) Yes, we have submitted 3,158 tactical reports and 1,237 strategic reports to the government. Based on information we provided, the authorities have arrested 1,156 terrorists and referred them to courts after providing adequate evidence against them. We have followed up and concluded 974 intelligence cases related to terrorist activities in our bid to protect Iraq's national security. We have submitted 58 reports to the relevant authorities regarding conspiracies against government VIPs and members of the former National Assembly. We have prepared 155 studies about the activities and the internal and external threats to Iraq's national security. We have compiled 980 pieces of intelligence data for the authorities concerned about issues that threaten the national security of Iraq. In addition, we have been following up intelligence activities by some neighboring countries and their attempts to mobilize a number of Iraqis in a way that serves their aggressive schemes.
(Abbas) So how do you comment then on claims that the intelligence service has done nothing to fight terrorism and protect the country's security?
(Al-Shahwani) No comment.
(Abbas) With your permission, we insist on hearing your comment, though briefly.
(Al-Shahwani) The government, the ministries, and the relevant authorities are familiar with the accomplishments of the intelligence service and its efficient and professional performance.
(Abbas) We hear many official accusations from Iraq against the neighboring countries, that they support terrorism and violence in Iraq. There are accusations that they have turned the country into an arena for settling regional and international rivalries. Specifically, there are accusations against Iran and Syria. How does the Iraqi intelligence service evaluate foreign intervention in Iraq?
(Al-Shahwani) It is neither the duty, nor the domain of the intelligence service to answer to political questions. You can address this question to the prime minister or the foreign minister. Our duty in the intelligence service is to gather and analyze information and to submit them to the authorities concerned. It is not our duty to disclose evidence or our sources or to levy accusations against any person or any country. There are certain official Iraqi channels that can answer to these questions in view of their duties and authorities. The intelligence service is responsible for collecting and analyzing what could constitute a threat, distributing intelligence information in an effective and responsible manner, and submitting recommendations to the country's decisionmakers, in accordance with the Constitution. This means that our task is consultative.
(Abbas) Would you specify the areas of political and security deficiency that contribute to prolonging instability and the deterioration of the security situation in Iraq.
(Al-Shahwani) There are many reasons. To begin with, there are so many militia forces that are active in the country under the cover of democracy. In this way, you cannot establish the rule of law. This weakens and undermines the executive authority and its security arms in facing incidents of violation of law and attempting to spread security and stability. It is unfortunate to see the arming of terrorists, armed groups, and militias is much superior to that of the armed forces and the police. This is a serious imbalance which should be dressed as soon as possible.
(Abbas) What are the obstacles facing the prime minister in his efforts to practically materialize his plan of integrating the militias?
(Al-Shahwani) To begin with, I have my reservations on integrating the militias in the security forces. Integration is not the solution. The solution is to rehabilitate militia elements to join the civil service. Integration means officially recognizing the militias and condoning their acts. This should not happen at a time where the government, the parliament, and the political forces are trying to put the task of maintaining security and defense solely and exclusively in the hands of the armed forces. Attempts are under way to build the armed forces in a solid manner and to separate them from partisanship and politicization. I believe that all the armed forces should work under the authority of the prime minister. According to the Constitution, he is the commander in chief of the armed forces in terms of operations. No minister or commander in the police or in the armed forces should take orders from a party or a political group. The orders should come solely from the prime minister, who is the commander in chief of the armed forces. Once we reach this state, it will be possible for Al-Maliki to save a lot of time and effort in executing the government's program, particularly those aspects related to security priorities. I am speaking as an Iraqi citizen, not just as the head of the intelligence service. All leaders of the executive authority should work together as a team with the prime minister and should provide real support and not be a partisan or political burden for him.
(Abbas) It is alleged that you have failed to build an efficient intelligence service. All that you did was reinstate intelligence officers from the former regime. Consequently, the powerful Iraqi political forces have lost confidence in the new service. Some of them even accuse you of spying on them, targeting them, and trying to weaken and smear them. How would you comment on that?
(Al-Shahwani) Let me remind you in all clarity that the intelligence service is an organ of the state, not a tool for certain parties or groups. It is the duty of the intelligence service to refrain from any activity that would promote or undermine any legitimate Iraqi political party or any government official. The intelligence service is not permitted to be involved in any activity for or against any Iraqi citizen or any groups of citizens based on their ethnic, sectarian, racial, or language backgrounds or on the basis of their descent or tribal affiliation. The intelligence service is also bound to conduct its activities in accordance with basic freedoms and human rights, as stated in and guaranteed by either the State Administration Law or the permanent constitution, after it is approved. Therefore, any talk about the intelligence service siding with this party or that government official is not true. We have committed ourselves to carry out the duties that I mentioned earlier, and we will continue to do so. Concerning claims that we failed to build an efficient service, the reality on the ground and the testimonies of government officials and the specialists tell a different story. In response to claims that the intelligence service did nothing but reinstate the intelligence officers of the former regime, I would only say that this allegation does not even deserve to be addressed. One of the conditions to apply for the intelligence service is that the date of birth of the applicant should be 1970 and later. There have been certain exceptions and special cases with regard to officers. When the intelligence service was formed, we sought help from some of the members of the former intelligence services. This percentage did not exceed 5 percent. This was for certain considerations and with the knowledge and approval of the political forces. One of the conditions of eligibility was that there should be no question about their loyalty and dedication to the country and that they should not have been involved in any crimes against any Iraqi citizen. In addition, the Iraqi national intelligence service does not accept any person who is affiliated to any party. We have not and we will not accept in the intelligence service any person who is affiliated to any party.
(Abbas) Who is entitled to apply to the intelligence service?
(Al-Shahwani) Any Iraqi citizen is entitled to apply to work in the intelligence service, with certain conditions. He should not be a member of any party or political force. The aim is to guarantee the neutrality and integrity of the work of the service, and there should be no question about his loyalty to the country.
(Description of Source: Baghdad Al-Zaman in Arabic -- Baghdad-based independent Iraqi daily providing coverage of Iraqi, Arab, and international issues, headed by Iraqi journalist Sa'd al-Bazzaz; Internet version available at: http://www.azzaman.com)