

Annex A The Quartet—Influence and Disharmony Among Saddam’s Lieutenants

The Quartet comprised four of Saddam Husayn’s most senior lieutenants in the last years of his rule and provided high-level advice to Saddam on challenges facing Iraq. The four were as experienced, committed and loyal individuals as Saddam had available. Nonetheless, little of their advice was taken that did not conform to Saddam’s existing views. That a group as senior as the Quartet had so little influence on the Regime’s strategic policy indicates that the strategic intent of the Regime was Saddam’s alone. The Quartet had differing views on Iraq’s way forward on WMD, but the more cautious preferences within the group had little influence over Saddam’s actions.

This portion of the Report is largely based on testimony from former Regime officials who were active in many of Iraq’s former governing, economic, security and intelligence organizations. While they were critical to our assessment of the former Regime’s WMD strategy, the detainees would often minimize their involvement or knowledge of sensitive issues. The placement of blame or knowledge with individuals, who were not in a position to contradict their statements, such as deceased or fled to another country, was also a common occurrence. Notwithstanding, most detainees were very cooperative and provided insight into the inter-workings of the former Regime. Original documentation captured during Operation Iraqi Freedom has served to confirm, supplement, and reinforce detainee statements.

A Core of Lieutenants



'Ali



'Izzat



Ramadan



Tariq 'Aziz

In 1996, Saddam Husayn formed a committee of senior Regime figures, known as the Committee of Four, or Quartet, to advise him on foreign policy and other national issues. For all but the last months of its existence it was comprised of Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan Al Jizrawi, Revolutionary Command Council Vice Chairman 'Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri, Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz 'Issa and 'Ali Hasan Al Majid (aka Chemical 'Ali).

The Quartet was not a uniform group. Ramadan, in an organizational sense, and 'Aziz, philosophically, represented old-style Ba'thism. 'Izzat Ibrahim was increasingly a tribalist as well as an advocate of a more religious complexion for the Regime. 'Ali Hasan was Saddam's closest relative in the government before the appointment of Qusay to the Ba'th leadership and he served as the family's man in the Quartet.

How Much Power and Influence?

The Quartet comprised some of the Regime's most senior and experienced individuals, but it did not have a significant impact on the Regime's policy on any critical issue. Instead, the Quartet had only the appearance of power. It did not command its own agenda; instead it advised Saddam only on issues he chose to refer to it. Likewise, the Quartet offered no proactive advice and had no executive power or policy-determining role, and it lacked a dedicated staff to conduct analysis or write assessments.

- Personal divisions in the group hindered any attempt to influence Saddam as US pressure on Iraq began to mount, particularly after 2000. Two Quartet members claim to have been private dissenters from the policy of obstructing WMD disarmament, but there is no evidence they attempted to press Saddam on the issue through the Quartet. Quartet members were personally distrustful of colleagues to the point of fear. Mutual distrust and the group's widely varied experience of the outside world limited its ability to speak decisively on strategic and foreign issues.
- Longstanding conflicting lines of communication to Saddam further eroded the Quartet's effectiveness and solidarity. Backchannel communications to Saddam were a fixture of his rule. Saddam's growing reclusiveness after the mid-nineties increased this practice and the Quartet was immune neither to its members using backchannels against colleagues nor to disrupting effects of such practices on the body's effectiveness. 'Izzat Ibrahim reported his summary of Quartet recommendations, often only to have them contradicted by Tariq in separate discussions with Saddam.
- The Quartet, however, was solidly united on issues unrelated to Iraq's external problems. All Quartet members espoused hate of Shi'a, Kurds, democrats, communists, clerics, monarchists, free markets and most other Arabs. This unity did not transfer to a common coherent view of the wider world or create a common assessment of how to deal with Iraq's confrontation with the Coalition, or how to manage the crisis.

- Despite a limited ability to shape policy, the Quartet still carried considerable prestige among more junior levels of the Regime. The Quartet's existence reassured Regime supporters that Saddam's decisions had the benefit of the best minds in the leadership. Conversely, the individual networks of subordinates and followers of Quartet members meant that there was some transmission of Saddam's intentions through government. The Quartet was seen from below as powerful, even though—as the Regime evolved—senior lieutenants such as the Quartet members were personally little more than reflections of Saddam's own authority.

Chains of Command

Saddam was formerly an able administrator within standard civil service and military structures, but starting in the mid-1990s, his methods changed dramatically. Saddam duplicated his mastery of formal administration with increasing resort to a network of family and personal relationships, using verbal instructions heedless of formal chains of command. His motives appear to have been a combination of increasing obsession with personal security and a prioritization of personal interests.

- This development blurred Iraq's formal mechanisms for developing state policy. Saddam had always retained the prerogative of final policy determination, but the process by which he formed policy became progressively less clear, even to senior participants in the system.
- As Saddam became less wedded to formal processes, the Quartet—an advisory body to begin with—was poorly placed to lock into formal chains of command and determine outcomes.

Perceptions of Threat and Challenge

The striking feature of the Quartet's members was their inward focus. They were not cosmopolitan and their insularity hurt their ability to appreciate or assess what other countries saw as their interests and how Iraq's behaviour might create conflict. The Quartet, including 'Aziz, had a mindset of Iraq versus the world, rather than Iraq as part of the world. Even the globetrotting 'Aziz remained focused on Saddam's will and his exclusive power to determine Iraq's course.

With the partial exception of Tariq 'Aziz, the Quartet had only a limited and hazy view of the United States, its interests and how policy was formed and driven in Washington. At no stage did the Quartet demonstrate a strategic concept of what the US wanted with Iraq, where common ground and differences really lay, and the nature of the challenge the US or Coalition presented. Nor did they have a strategy for dealing with the West, apart from tactical games at the UN.

- Saddam shared this myopic view. Saddam had a view of US goals, but it was wide of the mark: he said he believed the US had achieved all it wanted in the Gulf after Desert Storm and that a continuing "Vietnam syndrome" about casualties precluded a full invasion of Iraq. Only in very late 2002 did Quartet members Ramadan and Tariq come to profoundly disagree with Saddam's view of US intentions and conclude that Iraq's ability to manage Coalition pressure was collapsing. But Ramadan and Tariq have since been concerned to portray themselves as, by then, too frightened and powerless to avert Saddam's collision with Washington.
- Saddam may have been closer to the mark in his sense that ultimate US policy in Iraq was Regime change. According to 'Aziz, Saddam decided at the time of Irangate (the covert supply of missiles to Iran in 1987) that the United States could not be trusted to support Baghdad. 'Ali Hasan said that in the 1990s Congressional calls for the overthrow of Saddam meant that there was no prospect of a strategic dialogue with Washington.
- The Quartet had little appreciation of global change since the end of the Cold War or how it affected Iraq's interests and options. Instead, they focused

unilaterally on Iraq's deteriorating relationship with the West, which was coincidental with such change. They did not seek to capitalize on Iraq's potential significance in global trade through its place in the oil market. The Quartet never deliberated over globalization as a concept and how to position Iraq within it.

The Quartet's view of the rest of the Arab world was almost as limited. Most members of the Quartet had negotiated for Iraq with other Arab states, but the Quartet had no strategy for building an Arab constituency from 1996 to 2003. The Arab world was not considered a resource for Iraq, either to bolster efforts against Iran or to act as intermediaries with the West. Instead, the Quartet seems to have shared Saddam's aversion to some Arab states, Saudi Arabia, in particular, and to some extent Egypt. The Quartet was not pan-Arabist like Nasser or Ghaddafi. Yet 'Ali Hasan was surprised in 2003 that no Arab state protested against the attack on Iraq.

- Instead, the Quartet's concept of who were Iraq's 'friends' harked back to Baghdad's perception of the different circumstances of the Cold War (Russia); of the UN as the pivotal player (France and Russia) and (very rarely) Malaysia, which was at the time Chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

Regime Strategic Goals

The Quartet had a common set of strategic goals, which were driven by Saddam. All Quartet members prioritized security against Iran before all else. They saw Iran as bigger, hostile and that it had in the years since the Iran-Iraq war overtaken Iraq in WMD development. The Quartet recognized no progress toward containing Iran would be possible without first getting out of sanctions.

- The Quartet did not publicly advocate a particular strategic role for Iraq. Privately, it was not a proponent of regional hegemonism, whether over Kuwait, or the region, nor did it consider the use of WMD to that end. Ramadan and 'Aziz had thought the attack on Kuwait was folly and Ramadan opposed it in the RCC.

- Opposition to Israel was ritualistic. Quartet members saw Israel as a secondary threat compared to Iran. Israel had no land border with Iraq and was unlikely to mount a sustained attack on Iraq.

Shaping Regime Intent—Saddam, WMD and the Lieutenants

All Quartet members were convinced that WMD had saved Iraq in the war against Iran. ‘Ali Hasan and ‘Izzat Ibrahim were personally involved in the use of chemical weapons (CW) in securing the Regime during the Shi’a Intifada by virtue of having held area commands in the region of unrest, although much of the physical organization of CW use lay with Husayn Kamil. But none saw the Quartet as an originator of WMD policy, nor saw themselves as promoters of WMD.

- Nuclear weapons (rather than WMD generically) were not a Quartet issue. Among the leadership, nuclear weapons as a goal appears to have been a particular priority of Saddam himself. ‘Aziz believes Saddam was ‘fully committed to obtaining a nuclear weapon’ throughout his career, but there is no evidence that Quartet members were enthusiastic about a nuclear program and no hint of Saddam referring the issue to the Quartet at any stage.
- Ramadan said that he, and to a lesser extent Tariq, opposed WMD in the later sanctions period because it created more problems than benefits. Ramadan during UNMOVIC tried to rid Iraq of WMD, in particular by pursuing an untrammelled access policy, but alleges he was frustrated by Saddam and his relatives.
- Indeed, it was on the cost/benefit analysis of WMD in terms of Iraq’s economy and diplomatic relations that the most distinct policy cleavage in the Quartet emerged. Ramadan, and to a lesser extent Tariq, believed strongly that Iraq’s advantage lay in getting rid of WMD. Such a move would lift sanctions, normalize relations with the West and then allow reassessment of how to deal with Iran. Ramadan

and ‘Aziz would not have ruled out a return to WMD, but they were more focused on the outcome of containing Iran rather than the means. ‘Ali Hasan and ‘Izzat Ibrahim were more motivated by catering to Saddam’s views, and neither advocated any alternative thinking about WMD and containing Iran. Therefore, there was a divergence of ends versus means, with Saddam having a totemic attachment to WMD despite the costs, a view not shared by all Quartet members.

- The ever present danger of Iran was the most important long term factor in Quartet thinking. The Quartet thought Iraq was losing an arms race with a hostile larger neighbor. To the extent that there was support for WMD development among Saddam’s subordinates, Iran was the most important driver. Those prepared to support WMD disarmament to achieve peace with the UN, would probably not have ruled out WMD rearmament if it was necessary subsequently to counter Iran.
- There was also some acceptance of Saddam’s notion that WMD was the right of all nations and his opposition to multilateral counterproliferation. Quartet thinking was influenced by a belief that WMD is inseparable from industrialization and that dual use is inevitable.

Fear and Loathing in Baghdad

Saddam did not trust the Quartet in a personal security sense. Only ‘Izzat Ibrahim was allowed to drive himself to meetings with Saddam (the others were collected and driven in darkened limousines), though his mobility seems to have been curtailed toward the end. Quartet members were physically frightened of Saddam. Ramadan recalls a continuing fear of incarceration and that his son-in-law was jailed for two years. ‘Aziz’s son Zayyid had also been jailed for a period. ‘Ali Hasan also was seen by his peers as fearful, despite his blood relationship and toadying.

Annex B Iraq's Intelligence Services

Overview

Iraq used multiple intelligence services to collect on the Regime's various international and local concerns. The Iraqi Intelligence Service was the former Regime's largest intelligence service; the Directorate of General Military Intelligence and the Directorate of General Security supported the Regime on a smaller scale.



Iraqi Intelligence Service



Directorate of General Military Intelligence



Directorate of General Security

The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) served the Regime as a conventional intelligence service, but it also undertook denial and deception operations to thwart UN inspectors and for the illicit procurement of dual-use materiel and military equipment. The Directorate of General Security (DGS) and Directorate of General Military Intelligence (DGMI), however, generally performed intelligence and security operations in a comparable fashion to other countries' intelligence services. This annex will provide a view of the most recent organizational structures of these security services.

There are a few particular intelligence entities specifically involved in the WMD story:

- IIS M4 collected overseas intelligence against UN Missions dealing with Iraq
- IIS M4/4/5 provided support to sensitive, and sometimes illicit, procurement
- IIS M5/4/14 conducted surveillance of all UN missions within Iraq
- IIS M9 and M16 conducted "special substances" research and development
- IIS M17 collected signals intelligence against the UN
- IIS M20 assisted the aforementioned directorates in human surveillance
- IIS M23 provided security to Military Industrialization Commission and Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission facilities

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The Iraqi Intelligence Service

IIS Structure and Functions

The original mission of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), commonly known as the *Mukhabarat*, was foreign intelligence collection, domestic counterintelligence, and clandestine operations—standard activities for intelligence services worldwide—but the former Regime also used the service, beginning in late 1997, as a tool for the Military Industrial Commission (MIC) and its illicit procurement efforts. The IIS consisted of over twenty compartmented directorates, under the leadership of Tahir Jalil Habbush. The IIS also assisted in the obstruction of UN inspection missions and concealment of sensitive materials, equipment, and documentation for the former Iraqi Regime.



Tahir Jalil Habbush.

M1, Office of the Director

M1 was the executive directorate of the IIS. Subordinate branches provided administrative functions, public relations, the creation of cover documentation for field agents, and general support to the entire service. The most recent director of M1 was Khudayr Isma'il Ibrahim Al Mashhadani.

M2, Directorate of Administration and Accounting

This directorate managed daily administrative affairs and provided the following services: salaries and retirement services; logistic support, including vehicles and medical services; and liaison with government ministries and directorates. M2 also supervised house rentals for each IIS directorate. Every directorate maintained at least one safehouse for relocating operations from regular directorate offices. Husayn Muhsin Hasan, M2's director, held his position for the eight years prior to OIF.

M3, Directorate of Data Processing and Information Security

Commonly referred to as the Computer Directorate, and often mistakenly translated as Finance, M3 focused on the training and use of information tech-

Structure of M4

- M4/1 Arab Countries
 - M4/1/1 Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan
 - M4/1/2 Egypt and Sudan
 - M4/1/3 Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria
 - M4/1/4 Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf States
 - M4/2 Iran and Turkey
 - M4/3 Palestine and Israel
 - M4/4 United States and Europe
 - M4/4/5 Scientific and Technical Intelligence Department
 - M4/8 Special Projects
 - Commercial Section
 - Accounting Section
 - Liaison Section
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
nology in the IIS. Sa'd 'Abd-al-Razzaq Al Majid Al Tikriti was responsible for the information, documentation, and file storage for the IIS.

M4, Directorate of Foreign Intelligence

M4 was the primary directorate for foreign intelligence collection and foreign operations—it is also referred to as the “Secret Service Directorate,” when literally translated. Collection primarily focused on political and economic information; however, information regarding the military, media, health, and the administrative capabilities of foreign countries was also collected.

M4 was headed by Hasan Izbah Thalij Al 'Ubaydi until 2003. As the director, Hasan reported to IIS Deputy Director Khalil Ibrahim Al Sultan, who was responsible for M4, M5, M40, and monitoring (possibly M-20) directorates. Previously, Hasan had been the M2 Director and the Office Director of M1.

A fifth division within M4 targeted Iraqi opposition groups operating outside of Iraq. That division, however, was separated from M4 in 1997 and re-designated M40. The M4 and M5 directorates exchanged information whenever members of either directorate discovered intelligence related to the other directorate's responsibilities.



The Scientific and Technical Intelligence Department, headed by Muthanna Muhammad Ahmad Al Bayatti aided MIC's "Special Office" to facilitate the procurement of sensitive items and material through foreign channels (see Regime Finance and Procurement chapter for additional information).

M5, Directorate of Counterintelligence

M5 conducted domestic monitoring and counterintelligence operations within Iraq. Five divisions within M5 focused on specific regions of interest—similar to M4, its sister directorate. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab Fada'am was the M5 Director from 2000 until the fall of the former Regime; he was preceded by Ma'ad Ibrahim Al Duri (1996-2000) and Khalil Ibrahim 'Abdullah Nasiri (1994-1996).

Section M5/4/14 monitored all international organizations operating within Iraq, including the UN. As stated by a former manager within the M5 Directorate, "It [M5/4/14] monitored the UN inspectors

because that was its mission." Shakir Karhut headed this section until OIF and worked under Mu'ayyid 'Abd-al-Jalil, the head of M5/4. According to high level officials within the former Regime, these two were heavily involved in collection efforts against the UN.

The IIS General Affairs Division (M5/5) is the most recent sub-directorate. It was specifically created to act as the "catch-all" for M5 operations within Iraq. Section 18 operated more than 40 domestic businesses within Iraq, such as restaurants, hotels, travel services, souvenir shops, and truck service centers, in order to collect information on foreigners routinely entering Iraq. Other sections reportedly monitored foreign journalists, the media, and foreign students within Iraq.

Structure of M5

- *M5/1 Iran, Turkey, Israel*
 - *Section 1 – Iran*
 - *Section 2 – Turkey*
 - *Section 3 – Israel*
 - *M5/2 Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, & The Gulf States*
 - *Section 4 – Syria and Lebanon*
 - *Section 5 – Jordan*
 - *Section 6 – The Gulf States*
 - *M5/3 North African and East Asia*
 - *Section 7 – Non-Arab States in Asia*
 - *Section 8 – Arabian States in Africa*
 - *Egyptian Embassy Department*
 - *Egyptian Citizens and Business in Iraq Department*
 - *Sudan and Somalia Department*
 - *Algeria and Libya Department*
 - *Morocco and Tunisia Department*
 - *Section 9 – Indian Continent and Non-Arab States in Africa*
 - *Department 1 – India*
 - *Department 2 – Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh*
 - *Department 3 – Africa*
 - *M5/4 Europe, the Americas, and the United Nations*
 - *Section 10 – Europe (Eastern, Western, or Central)*
 - *Section 11 – Europe (Eastern, Western, or Central)*
 - *Section 12 – Europe (Eastern, Western, or Central)*
 - *Section 13 – North and South America*
 - *Section 14 – International Organizations in Iraq (United Nations)*
 - *M5/5 General Affairs*
 - *Foreign Journalist Surveillance*
 - *Inter-agency Relations*
 - *Embassy Security*
 - *Section 18 – Domestic Projects*
 - *1 – Cover Businesses within Baghdad*
 - *2 – Cover Businesses outside of Baghdad*
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IIS Regional Directorates

The IIS had regional offices for local collection, which carried out the functions of various national-level IIS directorates in the local governorates. These regional offices were called directorates despite their small size and limited capabilities. While they were not subordinate to the M5 Directorate, they fell under M5 administratively.

- *M51 The Northern Directorate (Ninawa) located in Mosul*
- *M52 The Al Ta'mim Directorate located in Kirkuk*
- *M53 The Al Anbar Directorate located in Ramadi*
- *M54 The Central Euphrates Directorate (Karbala') located in Karbala'*
- *M55 The Western Directorate (Al Muthanna) located in Al Samawah*
- *M56 The Southern Directorate (Basrah) located in Basrah*
- *M57 The Eastern Directorate (Diyala) located in Ba'qubah*
- *M58 The Salah-al-Din Directorate located in Tikrit*
- *M59 The Wasit Directorate located in Al Kut*

The IIS functional directorates, such as M4, M5, M20, and M22, had liaison offices within these regional directorates. Tasking would be passed down from the national-level to the local offices for collection or protection missions.

M6, Directorate of Internal Security

Khalid Najim ‘Abdallah Sultan Al Tikriti directed a staff of approximately 200 security officers who acted as political minders within the IIS. Personally appointed by Saddam, the M6 director had sweeping powers of investigation and financial authority.

Like a satellite office of the SSO, M6 and its three divisions monitored the loyalty of all IIS employees. The first division supplied liaison officers to each IIS directorate and was responsible for technical monitoring, the archives, and security of the MIC; the second division was responsible for political mail, diplomatic couriers, and information security; and the third was responsible for the physical security of IIS headquarters and its arsenal.

M7, Directorate of Investigation and Prosecution

M7 oversaw the Hakamiyah prison facility in Baghdad and was last headed by Haythim Khalil Ibrahim Al Rawi. M7 had sub-directorates to investigate Arabs and foreigners, as well as for prison management and administration. M6 and M10 often provided additional support in internal investigations and interrogations.

M8, Directorate of Liberation Movements

In the opinion of a former IIS officer, the M8 Directorate was a political office instead of an intelligence collection or exploitation directorate. Formerly directed by Khalid Al Duri, M8 was responsible for supplying administrative support for approved Palestinian organizations, receiving guests, providing hospitality, and arranging visits with officials. The source also stated that the M8 director reported directly to Tariq ‘Aziz on matters concerning Palestinians coming to Iraq from Syria.

M9, Directorate of Communications

M9 dealt with landline and wireless communications requirements between all IIS directorates. The IIS primarily used landlines for communications security; wireless communications were used only as an alternative if the land lines were down. The last director of M9 was Shibli Muhammad ‘Ali. Information is not yet available in regards to when M9 assumed its benign role of communications.

Structure of M9/J (1980 to 1990)

M9/J, headed by Dr. Muhammad from 1980 to 1987, consisted of at least five sections until 1984: Administration and Archives, Analysis and Biology Testing and Concealment, Evaluations, Implementation, and the Special Material sections. After 1984, M9/J restructured its five branches:

- *Administration and Archives Section*
- *Secret Communications Section*
- *Physiochemical Analysis and Criminal Investigations Section*
- *Special Materials Sections*
 - Chemical Production*
 - Analysis and Implementation*
- *Explosives Section*
 - Explosives Preparation*
 - Explosives Investigation*

The Secret Communications section handled the monitoring of postal communications and the development of invisible or secret inks. The Physiochemical Analysis and Criminal Investigations section conducted scientific analysis and research. The Explosives section was an independent unit that was located separate from the rest of M9/J to keep it as compartmented as possible. It conducted both explosive preparations and investigations for both offensive and defensive purposes.

Dr. Al Azmirli, after leaving M9/J in 1987, acted as a technical and scientific consultant who reported directly to the IIS director. Dr. ‘Ali Mukhlif replaced Al Azmirli as head of M9/J, however by 1988, Dr. Mukhlif could not directly report to the IIS director as in the past. He was required to report to a General Director (director level) and a “technical advisor.” Mukhlif would see the department through its next transformation in 1990, but he was replaced by Dr. ‘Amir ‘Awan Juma’ a Al Tikriti in 1991.

From 1980-1990, M9 developed chemical and biological weapons, produced toxins, poisons, and lethal devices for intelligence or assassination operations, and tested its products on prisoners. In the early 1980s M9 was known as the IIS Science and Technology Directorate, which had four divisions: Engineering, Chemical, Mechanical, and Electronics. M9/J, a subordinate section headed by Dr. Muhammad ‘Abd-al-Mun’im Al Azmirli, established labs after the start of the Iran-Iraq War for the development of chemical and biological weapons. According to Nu’man ‘Ali Muhammad Al Tikriti, a former department director within M9/J, prisoners from Al Hakamiyah Prison were used and killed by M9’s products in late 1983.

M9/J was removed from M9 in 1990, and it was assigned as its own directorate, M16. It retained most of its previous structure except for the Explosives Section, which was removed from its ranks entirely and also assigned as its own directorate, M21 (*See the M16 and M21 sections of this annex for additional information*).

M10, Directorate of Studies and Research

M10, also referred to as the “analytic directorate,” was responsible for seeking, compiling, translating, and publishing open source materials from foreign governments, agencies, and organizations. Researchers investigated political, economical, social, international, and military topics and in-house linguists made translations. The director of M10 was Anmar Latif Nusayyif Jasim Al Dulaymi.

M11, The Training and Preparation Institute

The Training and Preparation staff, approximately 70 employees, prepared lectures and intelligence courses for both new and current IIS officers and employees on a yearly curriculum. The director of M11 was Mu’affiq Saleh Al ‘Ali Al Tikriti.

M12, Directorate of Accounting

Headed by Nazar Yasin Al Maslawi, M12 was responsible for domestic and foreign bank accounts and IIS financial matters. Sub-directorates managed expenditures, financial archives, and salaries, as well

as supporting the comptroller. Each IIS directorate had an M12 officer to handle all accounting affairs of that directorate, such as the distribution of salaries, purchasing of equipment, food, clothing, and other directorate specific items.

M13, Directorate of Clandestine Operations

M13 was responsible for operational support services, such as lock-picking, surveillance photography, electronic eavesdropping, and counterintelligence functions at Iraqi embassies abroad. When a target was identified and approved for collection, M13 conducted the operation. Analysis of the collected information, however, was left to the requestor. M5 most likely tasked M13 to collect against UN inspectors, who were monitored through wire taps, listening devices, and hidden cameras at the Canal Hotel, which served as the UN Headquarters in Baghdad. After Desert Storm, the High Technology Photography and Electronics Research and Development Project was subsumed into the Directorate of Clandestine Operations. For this reason, M13 is also commonly referred to as the Technical Operations or Technical Monitoring Directorate.

M14, Directorate of Special Operations

M14, directed by Muhammad Khudayr Sabah Al Dulaymi, was responsible for training and conducting special operations missions. It trained Iraqis, Palestinians, Syrians, Yemeni, Lebanese, Egyptian, and Sudanese operatives in counterterrorism, explosives, marksmanship, and foreign operations at its facilities at Salman Pak. Additionally, M14 oversaw the “Challenge Project,” a highly secretive project regarding explosives. Sources to date have not been able to provide sufficient details regarding the “Challenge Project.”

M15, Directorate of Legal Affairs

M15 provided the IIS officers and employees with legal advice, handled all employees’ legal cases, reviewed all new laws that pertained to IIS officers, and implemented the laws and regulations within the IIS. While it served all of IIS, M15 primarily assisted M1 and M2.

Structure of M14

- *Special Operations Department, composed of a foreign and a domestic section, performed government-sanctioned assassinations inside or outside of Iraq.*
 - *The “Tiger Group” was similar to Special Operations, except that it was primarily comprised of suicide bombers.*
 - *The Training Department provided training for all IIS officers going abroad.*
 - *The Counterterrorism Department handled counterterrorism activities in Iraq and at embassies; reportedly, it disarmed terrorists hijacking a Sudanese airliner from Saddam International Airport.*
 - *The Administrative Department provided support services such as administration, finances, communications, and logistics.*
 - *The Anti-Iranian Department infiltrated operatives into Iran for intelligence collection and operated against Iranian groups attempting to enter Iraq.*
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M16, Directorate of Criminology

M16 was created when M9/J was extracted from M9 and designated as its own directorate in 1990. The directorate retained the organizational structure of M9/J except for the Explosives Section, which was also designated as its own directorate, the Al Ghafiqi Project (M21). The services M16 provided in the fields of chemical and biological science, criminal investigation and forensic sciences, chemical and poison production, and intelligence support offer insight to its nickname, the “Directorate of Special Logistics.” Nu’man ‘Ali Muhammad Al Tikriti was M16’s last director having served from 1996 until 2003.

In late 2001 or early 2002, M16 requested assistance from the IIS Scientific and Technical Intelligence Department (M4/4/5) to acquire specialized equipment for M16. Devices were requested for atomic absorption, infrared, and ultraviolet spectrophotometers for the analysis of chemical substances; x-ray and bomb detection devices which were planned for use in Iraqi embassies; materials used to detect and exploit latent fingerprints for criminal investigations; and a device used to test for forged or falsified documentation requested by the Secret Communications Directorate.

Structure of M16 (2000 to 2003)

- *The Secret Communications Division was responsible for document seals and stamps, document authentication, and mail security. The division also worked on improving secret and invisible inks.*
 - *The Physiochemical Analysis and Forensic Criminal Investigations performed various testing on foods and medicines, e.g. it tested for bacteria and viruses in food, dairy products, and water. The forensics department specialized in fingerprints, ballistics, forgery, and the protection of diplomatic mail.*
 - *The Chemical Preparation Division conducted theoretical and practical research on toxic materials, poisons, and anesthetics for operational use by other IIS directorates, such as M4 or M5.*
 - *The Explosives Division, also known as “Section 27,” was responsible for detecting and disabling of explosive devices relating to the mail or vehicles, as well as producing such devices for the IIS. This division was a hybrid between M16’s former explosive ordinance disposal section and the former M21 Al Ghafiqi Project.*
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M17, Directorate of Signals Intelligence

M17 monitored, collected, and analyzed external signals and voice communications. The signals intelligence project, formerly known as “Project 858,” was almost completely destroyed during the first Gulf War. Following the war, the project was resurrected and re-designated the “Hadi Project.” Responsibility for it was passed between Iraq’s intelligence and security services until a presidential decree in the late 1990s brought it permanently into the IIS as M17. The directorate was the largest in the IIS, consisting of four divisions and two branches, and employing between 2,000 to 2,500 personnel. Khalid Karim Khalifa Braish Al ‘Ajili was the director of M17 from 1995 to the beginning of OIF.

M17 was the pinnacle of Iraqi signals intelligence. It monitored internal Iraqi communications to ensure communications security, intercepted foreign military communications, and collected against foreign embassies, UN Headquarters, and, from 1995 to 1998, UN inspectors.

The Evolution of the Former M9/J Department

After M9/J was reassigned as M16 in 1990, it was headed by Dr. 'Amir 'Awni Juma'a from 1991 until 1996, when he was replaced by the last M16 director, Nu'man. M16's organization from its inception until early 2000 consisted of the following four sections:

- Administration and Archives Division
- Secret Communications Division
- Physiochemical Analysis and Criminal Investigations Division
- Special Materials Division
 - Chemical Production Section
 - Explosives and Radiation Detection and Treatment Section

According to captured documentation, on 29 September 1999 the IIS Director approved the deconstruction of the Special Materials Division, as well as M21, the Al Ghafiqi Project. The Special Materials Section was reorganized so that the Explosives Detection and Treatment Section could merge with the Al Ghafiqi Project under M16 for the “unification of technical specialties...since the defensive work is so closely tied with offensive work.” The Radiation Detection utility was to remain with M16.

A consulting agency for the IIS Director proposed that the Chemical Production Section become an independent division subordinate to M16, comprised of a Chemical Supply Department and an Intelligence Applications Department. Its duties at the time of reorganization consisted of preparing substances which paralyzes the individuals' functionality, preparing tranquilizers and hypnotics for intelligence uses, preparing safe instant lethal substances, and camouflaging these substances by various means such as drinks or medicine. This was the last restructuring of M16 prior to OIF. (See the M21 section for additional information on the Al Ghafiqi Project.)

Structure of M17

- M17/1 Service and Administration Division
 - M17/1/1 Personnel
 - M17/1/2 Vehicle Maintenance
 - M17/1/3 Building Maintenance
 - M17/2 Analysis Division
 - M17/2/1 Algorithmic Encryption Design
 - M17/2/2 Electronic Cryptanalysis
 - M17/2/3 Manual and Mechanical Cryptanalysis
 - M17/3 Operations Division—Intercept, Jamming, and Direction Finding
 - Central SIGINT Station at Al Rashidiyah
 - North SIGINT Station at Mosul
 - South SIGINT Station at Basrah
 - West SIGINT Station at Al Rutbah
 - Communications Security Monitoring
 - M17/4 Technical Support Division
 - Signals Research
 - Technical Analysis
 - Satellite Intercept
 - Computer Branch
 - Analysis and Production Branch
 - Administration
 - Translation
 - Military Communications
 - Civilian Communications
 - COMSEC Analysis
 - Encrypted Communications Analysis
-

M18, Directorate of Residency

M18 issued visas, determined residency status, and enforced immigration laws for all Arabs and foreigners living in Iraq.

M19, Directorate of Commercial Projects

The Directorate of Commercial Projects ran front companies to help illicit procurement and importation of dual-use materiel and other prohibited items into Iraq. The Foreign Branch oversaw the management of trade with overseas front companies, such as MIC's Al Basha'ir Trade Company, Ltd., and the Syrian firms SES Trade Company and the MAS Economic Group. The Domestic Branch oversaw the management of numerous small businesses throughout Iraq to financially supplement IIS operations, usage by the IIS, such as print shops for forgery, and strategic surveillance of foreign interests.

In 1997, M19 director Mana' 'Abdallah Rashid ordered a halt to all Foreign Branch operations as a result of the failure of one of its companies to deliver spare parts, tires, batteries, electronic equipment, and vehicles. At the same time, the manager of the Domestic Branch was jailed for attempting to smuggle copper out of Iraq. These two incidents led to the permanent closure and subsequent salvage of the Directorate of Commercial Projects. M19 was disbanded and its sections were reassigned to the M4 and M5 Directorates. The Foreign Branch projects were re-designated as M4/8 under the Directorate of Foreign Intelligence. The Domestic Branch projects were re-designated as M5/5/18 under the Directorate of Counterintelligence (*see Regime Finance and Procurement for additional information on illicit procurement*).

M20, Directorate of Surveillance

The Directorate of Surveillance monitored individual targets with human surveillance and may have been involved in collection against UN inspectors. M20, with three field intelligence units and an administrative branch, was directly subordinate to the IIS Deputy Director. Support requests had to first be approved by the Deputy Director before tasking was executed. Requests also had to provide specific information on targets and the intended location of surveillance. Restricted manpower and resources, however, limited collection periods to approximately seven to ten days. Akram 'Umar Salih Al Tikriti was the director of M20 from 2000 to OIF.

Structure of M18

- *M18/1 The Arab Division: responsible for all Arab immigrants regardless of country*
 - *M18/2 The Foreigners Division: responsible for all non-Arab immigrants*
 - *M18/3 The Airport Division: a satellite office located at the point-of-entry*
 - *M18/4 The Regional Division: satellite office located at the various regional governorates and points of origin.*
-

M21, The Al Ghafiqi Project

The Al Ghafiqi Project existed to make explosive devices for the IIS to be used in assassination and demolition operations. The Explosives Section of M9/J was extracted from the M9 Directorate in 1990 and assigned as its own directorate, M21; at the same time, the remainder of M9/J was also extracted and designated as M16. The name Al Ghafiqi, referring to a geographic area between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, was most likely attached to the project in 1990 as it was designated as an independent directorate. The project is also known as "*sheen 27*," where 'sheen' is the first letter in the word for Section, however, this was not seen until after 2000.

Khalil Ibrahim Fayad Al Sabahi was the director of the former Explosives Section since 1986, and he continued to head the organization as the M21 Director until his departure in 1996. Dr. 'Amir 'Awni Juma'a, who was previously the M16 director until 1996, was the superintendent of the Al Ghafiqi Project during the negotiations to integrate Al Ghafiqi into M16 in 1999. Badi'a Muhammad Salih was the director of the project, which was decommissioned in 2000 and reassigned to M16.

No one person constructed an entire explosive device alone. The construction process drifted through the sections of the directorate. An improvised explosive device (IED) began in the Chemistry Department which developed the explosive materials for the device, the Electronics Department prepared the timers and wiring of the IED, and the Mechanical Department produced the igniters and designed the IED. Al Ghafiqi constantly invented new designs or methods to conceal explosives; books, briefcases, belts, vests, thermoses, car seats, floor mats, and facial tissue boxes were all used to conceal PE4, C4, RDX, or TNT.

M22, Directorate of Protective Services

The Directorate of Protective Services was similar in composition to a light infantry battalion and it protected IIS facilities along with the Ba'ath Party national leadership. Its most recent director prior to OIF was Khassam Ibrahim Omar Ayyub Al Tikriti. M22 provided external security at IIS sites, while M6 handled internal security issues—similar to the way that the SRG and SSO handled security at presidential palaces.

Three subordinate divisions in M22 carried out various physical security missions for the IIS Headquarters in Baghdad, the Mujahiddin è Khaliq (Iranians opposed to the current Iranian Regime), and the IIS Regional Offices (M51 through M59). M22 personnel guarded all IIS safehouses, and M22 personnel may have been present in the event of the transportation of WMD materiel, because it had previously provided convoy security for the shipment of light weapons.

M23, Directorate of Military Industries

Also known as “*Al Munzhumah*,” M23 provided security for all MIC and IAEC sites, and it assisted the National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) with purging MIC facilities of documents to be safeguarded from the UN. An Iraqi Regular Army unit was commonly co-located at MIC facilities for external protection, but M23 handled security within the facility, as well as the security staff manning gates at industrial complexes, weapons manufacturing plants, chemical production plants, and MIC offices. M23 also provided limited security for three MIC companies: Armos, Al Basha'ir, and Al Mufakhir—all front companies for illicit MIC procurement. We do not know to what extent M23 provided security for these companies. The last director of M23 was 'Abd-al-Hamid Sulayman Ibrahim Al Huraymis Al Nasiri.

M23 officers also were involved in NMD document concealment and destruction efforts. In August 1998, Saddam ended cooperation with UNSCOM inspections, and soon after he ordered the creation of a NMD committee to purge all MIC records of sensitive documentation related to past prohibited programs. While many documents had already been declared, some were given to M23 agent 'Ayad Qatan Talab, the director of M23/6/1 Counter-Espionage Section, to keep in a lockbox. These documents have not yet been recovered.

Structure of M23

- *M23/1 Human Resources*
 - M23/1/1 Military Personnel*
 - M23/1/2 Civilian Personnel*
 - M23/1/3 Personnel Management*
 - M23/1/4 Passports and Visas*
 - *M23/2 Internal Security*
 - *M23/3 Investigations*
 - M23/3/1 Interrogations*
 - M23/3/2 Investigations*
 - M23/3/3 Jail*
 - *M23/4 Nuclear Energy*
 - M23/4/1 Companies*
 - M23/4/2 Opposition Group Activities*
 - M23/4/3 Counter-Espionage*
 - *M23/5 Maintenance Division*
 - M23/5/1 Management Section*
 - M23/5/2 Building Maintenance*
 - M23/5/3 Vehicle Maintenance*
 - *M23/6 Counter-Espionage Division*
 - M23/6/1 Counter-Espionage*
 - M23/6/2 Companies*
 - M23/6/3 Opposition Group Activities*
-

M40, Directorate of Opposition Group Activities

M40 targeted opposition groups based overseas, such as the Al Dawa Party, the Communist Party, and the Wahhabis. M40 tasked its satellite offices around Iraq to monitor coalition forces prior to OIF, but limited resources prevented any measurable success. A civilian, 'Isam Khudhayr 'Abbas Al Dulaymi Al Awani, was the director of M40 from 1990 to 9 April 2003. At that point, according to a former M40 officer, all M40 officers were told to burn their documents and go home. “It was over,” the source said, “the IIS did not exist anymore.”

Structure of M40

- M40/1 Monitors the Al Wafaq Party, Communist Party, and Separatists
 - M40/2 Monitors the Al Dawaa Party, Al Majlis Party, and the Wahhabis
 - M40/3 Monitors the Kurds
 - M40/4 Monitors external threats, Al Mu'tamar, and Independents
 - M40/5 Operations against the Kurds
 - M40/6 Monitors the Al Yazidis, Al Saabiah, and Al Ashurin
-



The Directorate of General Military Intelligence

The Directorate of General Military Intelligence (DGMI) was Iraq's main military intelligence service. The DGMI collected intelligence

on the military capabilities of the countries adjacent to Iraq, as well as Kurdish forces. The director of DGMI, Staff Lt. Gen. Zuhayr Talib 'Abd-al-Sattar, reported directly to the Presidential Secretary, despite the subordination of the DGMI to the Ministry of Defense.

In addition to military analysis and targeting, the DGMI acted as an internal police force within the Iraqi military by assigning DGMI Intelligence Officers to each military unit down to the battalion level. Technically, the officer's mission was intelligence support, but the majority of the officer's work centered on controlling corruption and theft within the unit. Just as the SSO placed political officers within the Republican Guard, the DGMI placed intelligence officers within the military services to monitor troops.

This organization has also been recognized as the General Military Intelligence Directorate (GMID), General Directorate of Military Intelligence (GDMI), Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), Military Intelligence Directorate (MID), and the *Istikhbarat*, the shortened version of its Arabic name: *Mudiriyah Al Istikhbarat Al 'Askriyah Al 'Ammah*.



The Directorate of General Security

The Directorate of General Security (DGS) provided local intelligence collection and prosecution of Regime opposition groups within the


individual governorates of Iraq. Little reporting exists about its composition and structure, but minor references to the DGS all reflect an effort focused against the infiltration of Iranian, Turkomen, and Kurdish oppositionists.

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Annex C Iraq's Security Services

Overview

The former Regime's security services protected the President, secured the presidential palace grounds, and guaranteed loyalty to the Regime. These organizations, however, also concealed information and material from United Nations weapon inspectors. This annex will provide a view of the most recent organizational structure of these security services.



The Special Security Organization, using personal escorts and protection units, maintained the innermost security levels surrounding the President and the Regime. The Republican Guard, comprised of the Special Republican Guard and the Republican Guard Forces Command, served as the outer rings of Regime and national security. Prior to 1996 the Special Republican Guard was specifically tasked to conceal WMD-related material in collaboration with the Special Security Organization.

This portion of the Report is largely based on testimony from former Regime officials who were active in many of Iraq's former governing, economic, security and intelligence organizations. While they were critical to our assessment of the former Regime's WMD strategy, the detainees would often minimize their involvement or knowledge of sensitive issues. The placement of blame or knowledge with individuals, who were not in a position to contradict their statements, such as deceased or fled to another country, was also a common occurrence. Notwithstanding, most detainees were very cooperative and provided insight into the inter-workings of the former Regime. Original documentation captured during Operation Iraqi Freedom has served to confirm, supplement, and reinforce detainee statements.



'Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri
Chairman



**'Abd Hamid Mahmud
Al Khatab Al Nasiri**
Secretary General



**Zuhayr Talib
'Abd-al-Sattar**
Director, DGMI



**Qusay Saddam
Husayn**
Director, SSO



Tahir Jalil Habbush
Director, IIS



**Rafi 'Abd-al-Latif
Tulfah Al Nasiri**
Director, DGS

The National Security Council

The National Security Council provided a forum for cooperation between Iraq's security and intelligence agencies regarding overlapping issues among the agencies and joint-service projects. It was comprised of 'Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri, 'Abd Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab Al Nasiri, and the directors of the four main security and intelligence organizations—the Special Security Organization (SSO), the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), the Directorate of General Military Intelligence (DGMI), and the Directorate of General Security (DGS).

'Izzat Ibrahim, Vice-President and the Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), acted as the chairman, and 'Abd acted as the Secretary General of the National Security Council. The Council did not have regular preplanned meetings, but it met periodically at 'Izzat's headquarters at Al Admani Palace in Baghdad to address any problems or issues that had emerged since the last meeting. Despite these meetings most problems—big or small—were brought directly to Saddam by the agencies' directors.

The presidential secretary, 'Abd, screened almost all of the reporting sent to the Presidential Office by the SSO, IIS, DGMI, and DGS. The directors of these organizations, including Qusay Saddam Husayn, who headed the SSO, reported directly to 'Abd, who chose what should proceed to the President. The correspondence from the SSO and IIS was opened by the presidential secretary himself, and not the staff. 'Abd then evaluated whether it was for the President's action or Daily Brief. If the matter related to routine administration, the Secretary acted on the correspondence, himself, and then he returned it to the originating office. However, this did not include the hiring and firing of department directors.

The presidential secretary had a higher status than Qusay prior to 2001. Qusay, as Director of the SSO, still had to report to 'Abd despite being the President's son. Qusay was no longer within 'Abd's chain of responsibility after Qusay was elected to the Ba'ith Party Leadership in May 2001, however, the SSO was still required to report to the presidential secretary.

The Special Security Organization

Saddam Husayn formed the Special Security Organization (*Jihaz al-Amn al-Khass* in Arabic) shortly after he became President in 1979. The assurance of Regime stability required a wide spectrum of support and services, and Saddam relied on the expertise of the Special Security Organization (SSO) until 2003. Saddam used the SSO, which consisted of over 5,500 personnel, to reveal any threats to him and his position.

Leadership of the Organization

Husayn Kamil Hasan Al Majid

Husayn Kamil Hasan Al Majid headed the SSO from as early as 1983 until 1989, according to a senior Republican Guard officer. By 1987, he was also the “Overseer” of the Military Industrial Commission, the Republican Guard (including the Special Republican Guard), Saddam’s Special Presidential Guard, and the Ministry of Oil.



Husayn Kamil

Husayn Kamil did not appear to rely on deputies. He had the power, because of his family ties and proximity to the President, to have anyone fired or have them placed under suspicion. A former subordinate noted “Husayn Kamil did not have a right-hand man, as he was too arrogant.” Many of the senior leadership believe that all of Iraq’s problems with the United Nations were the result of his unilateral decisions. He was briefly appointed to and eventually fired as the Minister of Defense in 1991, after which he was appointed by Saddam to be the Minister of the Military Industrial Commission. His transfer from the SSO in 1989 created a gap in SSO leadership (See the “Husayn Kamil” textbox in the Regime Strategic Intent chapter for additional information).

Fannar Zibin Al Hasan

During the first Gulf War, Fannar Zibin Al Hasan, a cousin of Saddam, directed the SSO. Fannar was a figurehead. Qusay Saddam Husayn, who was appointed by Saddam to be the deputy director, actually led the organization. Little is known about the SSO leadership from 1989 to 1991.

Qusay Saddam Husayn

Qusay became SSO Director in late 1991 or early 1992. The security organization lost much of its influence without Husayn Kamil. Many of the responsibilities were not passed to Qusay because he was viewed as inexperienced—he was approximately 24 years old when appointed to direct the SSO. Qusay was a graduate of the College of Law; he was not given military rank and always wore civilian clothes. For this reason Qusay enlisted the assistance of Husayn Kamil for leadership guidance.



*Qusay Saddam Husayn
Director, SSO*


With the assistance of Husayn Kamil from 1991-1995 and under the leadership of Qusay, the SSO undertook many functions, such as protection, collection, and deception operations. Together, these two used the assets at their disposal to orchestrate a denial and deception program against the United Nations.

After the departure of Husayn Kamil in 1995, Qusay supervised the command authority of the Republican Guard and the Special Republican Guard while simultaneously serving as director of the SSO. In title, Qusay was referred to as the “Honorable Supervisor of the Republican Guard,” but he was never referred to as “the commander.” Qusay was able to manage the SSO, though he did not have the seniority, experience, or depth in military matters to command troops. Commanders feared and respected Qusay because, much like Husayn Kamil, he had almost-absolute power in the Regime. When he spoke to military commanders, however, he would generally issue vague managerial directives.

Qusay stepped down as the Director of the SSO after he was elected one of two deputies in charge of the military branch of the Ba'th Party on 19 May 2001, three days after being elected to Ba'th Party membership. Managing his new responsibilities in addition to his role in the SSO was reportedly a heavy burden on Qusay.

Walid Hamid Tawfiq

Staff Maj. Gen. Walid Hamid Tawfiq held the position of SSO Director from June 2001 until September 2002. Walid, a staff major general at the time, was selected to fill Qusay's position because he was the most senior officer within the SSO. Qusay wanted to appoint the Director of Republican Guard Security to the position of SSO Director, but that officer was only a colonel. Qusay never completely relinquished control of the SSO. Qusay ordered Walid to report directly to him, though the normal chain of reporting for the SSO Director was to report security matters to the presidential secretary, 'Abd Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab Al Nasiri.



Walid Hamid Tawfiq

Qusay eventually relieved Walid of duty and returned as the Director of the SSO in September 2002. The circumstances around Walid's reappointment to the Governor of Al Basrah are uncertain. Walid claims that he was removed one week after he received a letter from Saddam admonishing him for monitoring an individual who was, without the knowledge of Walid, close to Saddam.

Structure of the Organization

Unlike the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), the directorates and branches of the SSO did not have a coded nomenclature.

Himayah—The Presidential Bodyguards

The first tier of security closest to Saddam took no direction from the SSO, as this responsibility was removed from the SSO during the late 1980s. The Himayah (Arabic for "Protection"), a general term for the Department of Senior Escorts (al-Murafiq al-Qadim) was composed of two groups, the Special Protection (Amn al-Khas) and the Special Guard (Haras al-Khas), which were directly accountable to the Secretary of the President, 'Abd Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab Al Nasiri. The Special Protection was with the President 24 hours a day, seven days a week to provide personal security. The Special Guard had more of a logistic role, providing personal services such as laundry, food, and shopping. The SSO picked the candidates and monitored the members of this group to ensure loyalty to Saddam.


The Office of the Director

The Office of the Director contained the staff closest to Qusay and daily SSO operations. Qusay relied less on the established officials of the organization, and by 1998 he developed his own close circle of personal aides much as his father had done. Among them were 'Ali Husayn Al Rashid, Qusay's longstanding personal bodyguard; Hani 'Abd-al-Latif Tulfah Al Nasiri, the first cousin of Qusay's mother; and Suhayl Muhammad Sultan Al Duri, Qusay's secretary, Director of Public Relations, and by default, the Official Secretary of the SSO Director (Office Manager). Suhayl replaced Sulayman 'Ulwan Ibrahim Al Huraymis Al Nasiri who served as Qusay's secretary since 1991 and Office Manager until 1997, when Qusay dismissed him.

The director's office had four sections that handled allocation of residential properties for SSO employees, administration of SSO computers, financial oversight, and the inter-office and outgoing mail.

The Directorate of Security Affairs

The Directorate of Security Affairs, the second tier of presidential protection, consisted of two sections that were charged with the security of presidential palaces, the office of the presidency, and Ba'th Party offices and headquarters. Made up of over 1,700 personnel,



The Special Security Organization.

the Directorate of Security Affairs was the largest directorate and last headed by Col. Muhammad Rijab Al Haddushi. It supplied protective services to the Presidential Diwan and Ba'th Party Regional Command, as well as the support contingency known as "Group 40," which was composed of drivers, cooks, and launderers who traveled with Saddam.

The Directorate of Republican Guard Security

Hani 'Abd-al-Latif Tulfah Al Nasiri, one of Qusay's most capable deputies, headed this directorate, which monitored loyalty to the Regime within the Republican Guard. In 2001 Qusay told Staff Maj. Gen. Walid Hamid Tawfiq, despite Walid's appointment to SSO Director, that he would not have control over



Hani 'Abd al-Latif

Hani or his directorate. Hani retained his position of Director of the Directorate of Republican Guard (RG) Security as he ascended the ranks of the SSO. Three

months after Walid was appointed as SSO Director, Qusay appointed Hani, his preferred choice for SSO Director, to the position of Assistant Director.

Three departments within this directorate closely watched the SRG, the Allahu Akbar Operations Command (1st RG Corps), and the Fat'h Al Mubayyin Operations Command (2nd RG Corps). While not large enough to warrant their own departments, two SSO Security Officers scrutinized the RG Missile Command and the RG Airbase at Al Rashid, as well (see **The Republican Guard** section, below, for additional information).

Prior to 1991 the SSO used security officers to monitor, educate, and discipline the military troops in an effort to protect against enemy intelligence. After 1991 the SSO shifted its focus to monitor the military commanders to guarantee their loyalty and political reliability. These security officers, reminiscent of Soviet commissars, were embedded within Republican Guard units down to the battalion level, and they did not answer to the RG chain of command.

SSO Security Officers underwent a special three-month course held by the SSO, commonly wore civilian attire or military uniform without rank and, by nature of their positions, were not commonly liked

Duties of the SSO Palace Security

The Directorate of Security Affairs oversaw the security details within the presidential palaces and facilities of the Iraqi Regime. While the Special Republican Guard (SRG) maintained the perimeter and main entrance gate security, the Directorate of Security Affairs provided close-protection internal security measures:

- *Access control for incoming and outgoing palace visitors, to include verifying authorizations, security badges, personal and vehicular searches.*
 - *Verifying personnel records for all inside and outside palace workers with the assistance of the Directorate of General Security (DGS).*
 - *Escorting or monitoring all workers (janitors, waiters, contractors, etc.) in the presidential palaces.*
 - *Requesting and validating annual security clearances from the Directorate of General Security for all enlisted and commissioned SRG personnel.*
-

by the other soldiers. In the event of disloyalty or a security breach, the security officer would report the event directly to the director of RG Security. For example, a security officer at the battalion level would not be required to pass the information through the brigade and division security offices. The Director of RG Security could bypass the SSO Director because of his special link with Qusay.

The Directorate of Communications

Secure communications between strategic Regime facilities was the responsibility of the Directorate of Communications, directed by Head Engineer Safa' Shakir Taha. This directorate established and maintained landline and wireless communications for all palaces, directorates, presidential and Diwan offices, and Republican Guard headquarters. Two departments within the directorate specialized in wireless and landline communications systems. The Landline Department was headed by Engineer Salam 'Aziz; the Wireless Department was headed by Engineer 'Abd-al-Rahman.

The SSO Security Branch

Similar in mission to the RG Security Directorate or a police department's Internal Affairs division, the SSO Security Branch monitored the personnel of the Special Security Organization. A cousin of Qusay, Fatik Karim Sulayman Al Majid, was the last known director of this branch. Fatik had almost constant access to Saddam, because the SSO Security Branch was Saddam's window into Qusay's inner circle.

Saddam appointed strong loyalists, all of whom were members of his personal guard staff, to each of the security and intelligence services near the beginning of 2001. All of these positions reported the activities of their various agencies to Fatik, Director of the SSO Security Branch. Khalid Najim 'Abdallah Sultan Al Majid Al Tikriti was appointed to head the IIS Security Branch (M6), Haytham Sulayman Al Majid was appointed to head the Security Branch for the Directorate of General Military Intelligence, and Salim 'Abd-al-Qatar Sulayman was appointed to head the respective security element of the Directorate of General Security.

Cross-checking of the various services placed the SSO in a superior position over these agencies. For example, the IIS was not informed of SSO operations, but the SSO would be informed of all IIS operations; only the liaison officers between the two organizations would communicate officially. If the IIS became aware of a Ba'th Party member plotting action against the Regime, the case would be passed directly to the SSO. However, if the IIS wished to keep a case, Saddam most likely would have been consulted.

The Surveillance and Information Branch

The Surveillance and Information Branch was tasked with monitoring Iraqi officials, all employees within the office of the presidency, and other designated targets, to identify individuals of questionable loyalty. The director of this branch, Rafi' Hamid Muhammad Al Sagmani, oversaw the operations of two sub-sections, the Telecommunications Monitoring Section, headed by Muhammad Ra'uf Ghassub, and the Human Surveillance Section, headed by Harith Al Duri. Rafi' was another of Qusay's close associates within the SSO.

Structure of the SSO Security Branch

- *The Organization Section monitored all assigned SSO personnel except those on the presidential detail. It had one officer assigned to each of the other branches and directorates within the SSO. This section was headed by Mu'ayyid 'Abd-al-Hamid.*
- *The Special Section monitored all assigned personnel to the presidential detail, including the protection detail, those who housed and provided logistics to the protection detail, and those who provided support services to Saddam (Group 40, shepherds for live meat, chefs, tailors, and day laborers). This section was headed by Sa'd 'Abdallah Zahran.*
- *The Investigation and Interrogation Section conducted investigations, interrogations, and detention of personnel for crimes ranging from theft to treason. Its jurisdiction was determined by Saddam or Qusay. This section was headed by Col. 'Adil Hamid Jamil.*
- *The Information and Identification Section maintained personnel files, marriage approval, weapons accountability, and organizational identification and passports for SSO personnel. The Information Section, also referred to as "Personnel," was headed by Samir 'Awad, and the Identification Section was headed by Muhammad Wahadi.*
- *The Separated Employees Section monitored all former SSO officers. Also known as the "Veterans' Section," this section was headed by Tha'ir Al Duri.*

Administration Branch

The administrative branch of the SSO, which was headed by Wasfi Mukhlif Al Ajili, had four subordinate sections: Supplies, Services and Maintenance, Personnel (Human Resources), and Accounting, which handled salaries and promotions.

Vehicles Branch

Despite having its own motor pool and vehicles, the SSO attempted to acquire parts or maintenance for its own vehicles from the Special Republican Guard. Lt. Col. 'Isam Mamud 'Abdallah Al Tikriti headed the transport assets of the SSO.

The Scientific Branch

The SSO operated a laboratory specifically to test the President's food. All food, clothing, and presidential supplies were acquired through the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Trade. This branch was headed by Dr. Sabah Shuhab Ahmad Al Sumaydi. His two immediate subordinates were Dr. 'Adnan Ibrahim, Head of the Department of Chemistry, and Dr. Mujaz Tawfiq, Head of the Department of Biology.

The lab tested anything specifically for the president, including clothing, and its function was very secretive, even within the SSO. For example, Qusay planned refusal to acknowledge that the lab belonged to the SSO, even if confronted by UN inspectors about the lab. The lab was previously declared as belonging to the Ministry of Trade, which originally set up the lab for the SSO. Therefore, UN inspectors examined the lab under the assumption that it belonged to the Ministry of Trade, yet, fully aware of the lab's true function with regard to Saddam. Had the SSO acknowledged its ownership of the lab, it would have further increased the level of distrust between inspectors and Iraq.

The Special Security Institute

While many SSO officers were already seasoned from prior intelligence service positions, all SSO officers were trained in Baghdad at the Special Security Institute, directed by Khalid Kulayb 'Awani. The Institute's primary mission was to educate SSO, SRG, and presidential office employees on all aspects of governmental security, including military training, political indoctrination, and security of presidential sites. It operated on a yearly schedule with classes beginning on the seventh day of January, a two-month vacation in July and August, and completion of the annual curriculum in December.

The basic course for Special Security Officers lasted three months at the Institute in the Al-Jihad district of Baghdad. The course consisted of physical security training relating to different types of facilities and premises, personnel security and search techniques, the debriefing of casual contacts, and methods used by hostile intelligence services to recruit sources. This course turned company-grade Republican Guard officers into SSO Security Officers, who subsequently were embedded into military units.

The Security Unit

The SSO had a battalion-sized unit responsible for the security of strategically important roads around Baghdad and Tikrit. Hasan Na'amah Hamid Al Alusi replaced Col. 'Uday Al Habbus as the commander of the Security Unit in 2001. The unit consisted of four companies and a command element. The first company was composed of police patrol cars, the second company were also police vehicles, including recovery vehicles, for traffic enforcement, the third and fourth companies were foot-patrols mainly recruited from the SRG.

The unit's main focus was the route between the Baghdad International Airport and the Republican Palace in Baghdad. Similar service was provided by the unit on other routes, but with less manpower requirements. These security operations were, generally, permanent assignments; the Security Unit was rarely tasked with other assignments.

Public Opinion Department

The Public Opinion Department collected information on all rumors regarding the Regime. This department, headed by Suhayl Muhammad Sultan Al Duri who simultaneously held the position of Manager of the Director's Office, maintained sources in all major cities who would report on all facets of public opinion regarding Saddam or the Regime.

Legal Department

The Legal Department, led by Judge Basim 'Umar Al Tikriti, was responsible for all legal cases involving employees of the SSO.

Research Department

The Research Department, headed by Dr. Mu'ayyid Al Tikriti, conducted a joint computer project with the Military Industrial Commission, according to former senior officers within the SSO command leadership. Allegedly, this section was comprised of four or five employees in addition to Dr. Mu'ayyid and was financed through the SSO. Neither Walid nor Hani, despite their senior positions within the SSO, knew much about the department's sensitive activities.

Collaboration With Other Services

The SSO collaborated with every Iraqi security or intelligence service on a limited scale—each service had a specific charter but overlapping responsibilities were common. Moreover, all of Iraq's services were monitored for loyalty to the Regime.

The SSO had links to every security and intelligence service of Iraq for political reasons, but it did not vet the reporting of the various agencies. All of the services shared similar reporting chains, however. Once a report had been seen by the director of the relevant service, it followed one of two paths: if the report related to administrative or financial matters, it went to the Presidential Diwan; if the report related to intelligence or security, it went to the Presidential Secretary.

The security and intelligence services relied on each other for operational missions as well. The SSO would be informed if an agency had a security breach or suspected disloyalty among its ranks. Alternatively, the SSO tasked the Directorate of General Security for background checks and the Iraqi Intelligence Service and the General Military Intelligence Directorate for collection strategies and technologies.



The Republican Guard

The Republican Guard (RG) consisted of two military branches charged with divergent missions outlined below. Nonetheless, both branches of the RG received orders from the RG

Secretariat, which was directly subordinate to Qusay Saddam Husayn. The last officer to hold the position of Secretariat General, more commonly referred to as Secretary General, was Staff Lt. Gen. Kamal Mustafa ‘Abdallah Sultan Al Nasiri.

The smaller RG branch, the Special Republican Guard, was the third tier of presidential security after the Presidential Bodyguards and SSO. The Special Republican Guard’s primary mission was the physical protection and security of the presidential grounds and other sites sensitive to national security.

The larger contingent, the Republican Guard Forces Command, was often recognized as the “elite fighting force of Iraq” and was also the group most often referred to when speaking of the Republican Guard. The Republican Guard Forces Command would be considered the fourth, and final, tier of the Regime security services.



Kamal Mustafa

Qusay, in the role of the “Honorable Supervisor” of the Republican Guard, like his father, kept a keen eye on the military forces closest to the Regime. No piece of military equipment could be moved—even for repair—by a brigade, division, or corps commander without the prior written permission of Qusay through the RG Secretariat. Security officers from the SSO were embedded within the Republican Guard to ensure that this was strictly followed and report if it was contradicted.

The Special Republican Guard

The primary mission of the Special Republican Guard (SRG) was to secure and protect presidential areas

and other sites sensitive to national security. Although tasked with guarding presidential grounds, the SSO officers also conducted all personal and vehicular searches and internal security. The SRG was responsible for manning gate guards and securing the grounds, perimeter, and surrounding areas. Even the SRG Commander, Brig. Barzan ‘Abd-al-Ghafur Sulayman Al Majid, was not permitted to enter any presidential grounds without prior approval. Saddam ensured that all military units were kept far enough away in order to prevent any potential coup.


The SRG was originally a large brigade composed of seven battalion-sized elements referred to as Regiments. The SRG bulked up to the size of a division in 1992 when the threat to the government increased, although it had never—before or after the threat—been trained for coup suppression. The SRG maintained its large stature until early 2000, when the branch could not support its own logistic requirements and was reduced from four brigades to one. It was again augmented to divisional size before Operation Iraqi Freedom, but the SRG units played no role in combat as maneuver units during Operations Desert Storm or Iraqi Freedom.



Barzan ‘Abd al-Ghafur

The chain of command within the SRG was strictly controlled, given the proximity of military troops to Saddam. Orders could only be passed down from the RG Secretariat to the SRG commander. The SSO at times would attempt to commandeer SRG assets for ad hoc tasks, but the SRG Commander would refuse to allocate a single vehicle without an official written order from the RG Secretariat.

The SRG, under the direction of the SSO, participated in WMD-related concealment activities from 1991 to 1995. Equipment, documents, and other unidentified sensitive materials from the Military Industrialization Commission were loaded on trucks and stored at SRG facilities in order to prevent their discovery by UNSCOM inspectors, according to numerous sources.



Republican Guard Organizational Structure.

The Republican Guard Forces Command

The primary mission of the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC) was to safeguard Regime stability and to protect the Regime from both foreign and domestic enemies. RGFC units helped repel the Iranian invasion in the mid to late 1980s, invaded Kuwait in 1990, suppressed the Shi'a and Kurdish uprisings in the 1990s, and briefly defended the approaches to Baghdad in 2003. The mission of the RGFC resembled that of the Regular Army—tactical defense of the Regime and nation.



Sayf Al-Din

The RGFC was composed of two corps-sized elements that were “supervised” by Qusay, but Staff Lt. Gen. Sayf-al-Din Fulayyih Hasan Taha Al Rawi, as Chief of Staff, was the operational commander. The original corps, the Allahu Akbar Operations Command (1st RG Corps), was dispersed in the northern half of Iraq and the other, the Fat’h Al Mubayyin Operations Command (2nd RG Corps), in the southern half of Iraq. Each corps had three division-sized elements referred to as a “Forces Command” and an independent Special Forces Brigade.

Two of these divisions were garrisoned in Mosul and Krikuk to support the Regular Army in the north, three heavy (armored) divisions protected the approaches to Baghdad, and one infantry division was garrisoned in Al Kut. The RGFC was the last and the heaviest armed tier of Regime security. While it was essential to the protection of the Regime, Saddam kept the units away from Baghdad to prevent their involvement in any military-led coups.

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Annex D Saddam's Personal Involvement in WMD Planning

The Iraq Survey Group recovered this recording of Saddam and senior officials discussing the use of WMD. This discussion was part of a more general meeting which would appear from the content to have taken place during the second week of January, 1991. This is of particular interest as it provides a compelling demonstration of Saddam's personal interest and involvement in WMD planning and preparation.

Saddam's Personal Involvement in WMD Planning

Saddam: I was talking to 'Abd and I told him there is no need to make a big fuss about these suits because we are going to use them in this special occasion, even if it is a Chinese design the collar, the neck line should be lower than this.

Speaker 2: The suit, Sir, will have a neck line like the Dishdasha (Traditional dress of Arabia), so we can use normal white shirt with it.

Saddam: Why did they bring it to us like this then?

Speaker 2: No, I saw the state minister wearing the suit.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, formally, we are wearing it, but you seem to be cold sir (everyone was laughing).

Saddam: I think the people who designed that suit will not make that mistake: First, because you wear it right on the body, so it will get dirty soon; secondly, out of elegance, the hand shouldn't appear from the suit like this.

Speaker 2: Sir, the design of the suit is with a white shirt and a collar (neck line) like dishdasha.

Saddam: Then my design is right.

Husayn Kamil: Absolutely right, sir.

Saddam: Then work on it and make the corrections to the sizes.

Speaker 2: Sir, we will amend it to be exactly with the neck line.

Saddam: Even if it appears a little bit. Now when some one wears a suit, of course the shirt line will appear a little bit, but here I prefer not to have it obvious.

Speaker 2: Sir, you can see that nobody is wearing it.

Saddam: It's forgotten, but now I will ask Abu Muthanna, because he is the best at remembering [shackling noise]. Since 1958 the Iraqi army has been using these kinds of suits [people commenting and talking in the background].

Saddam: I want to make sure that—close the door please [door slams]—the germ and chemical warheads, as well as the chemical and germ bombs, are available to the “concerned people,” so that in case we ordered an attack, they can do it without missing any of their targets?

Husayn Kamil: Sir, if you'll allow me. Some of the chemicals now are distributed, this is according to the last report from the Minister of Defense, which was submitted to you sir. Chemical warheads are stored and are ready at Air Bases, and they know how and when to deal with, as well as arm these heads. Also, some other artillery machines and rockets (missiles) are available from the army. While some of the empty “stuff” is available for us, our position is very good, and we don't have any operational problems. Moreover, in the past, many substantial items and materials were imported; now, we were able to establish a local project, which was established to comply with daily production. Also, another bigger project will be finalized within a month, as well as a third project in the coming two to three months that will keep us on the safe side, in terms of supply. We, Sir, only deal in common materials like phosphorus, ethyl alcohol and methyl [interrupted].

Saddam: Etc. . . . this is not important to me.

Husayn Kamil: So, Sir, regarding the germs and [he pauses].

Saddam: And the Chemicals.

Husayn Kamil: No, we have some of the chemicals available [interrupted].

Saddam: So, we qualify that the missiles, by tomorrow, will be ready on the 15th.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, we don't have the germs.

Saddam: Then, where are they?

Husayn Kamil: It's with us.

Saddam: what is it doing with you, I need these germs to be fixed on the missiles, and tell him to hit, because starting the 15th, everyone should be ready for the action to happen at anytime, and I consider Riyadh as a target.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, let me explain to you. What we produced now are the rocket heads and the containers, and we distributed them underground in three different locations. We considered these locations the best places we have, and that if we had a chance to scatter and to find more locations, then we would have done it. These locations are far away from Baghdad, this is problematic because of transportation which will take seven days to commute, but we minimized all the transportation procedures in a way. However, when we want to commute it, we cannot do it within one day Sir, and if we want to do it by plane, then, Sir, we have to go for the method [paused].

Saddam: Let's talk about it later [waiters entered the room, sound of plates banging and side talks to the waiters].

Husayn Kamil: (door slams) Sir, we have three types of germ weapons, but we have to decide which one we should use, some types stay capable for many years [interrupted].

Saddam: we want the long term, the many years kind.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, this option is available and all other options are available as well.

Saddam: You mean at which time should we use it and at which moment!

Husayn Kamil: Yes sir. That is why there has to be a decision about which method of attack we use: a missile, a fighter bomb or a fighter plane.

Saddam: With them all, all the methods.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, we have to calculate now [interrupted].

Saddam: Husayn knows about those.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, there are some calculations we have to do, since we have modified fighters. The bombs or the warheads are all available, but the moment for using them at zero hour is something we should indicate sir; we will say that this will be launched (interrupted).

Saddam: At the moment of use (zero hour), you should launch them all against their targets.

Husayn Kamil: All of the methods are available, sir.

Saddam: We don't want to depend on one option. The missiles will be intercepted and the planes, at least one will crash, but whenever the missiles or planes fall down over the enemy land, then I consider the goal is achieved and the mission fulfilled.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, it is available and stored "somewhere," but if you, Sir, order us to transfer it, we are a bit worried it will cause contamination. It has been stored for 45 to 47 years, and yet has not been certified as being safe (uncontaminated). Sir, it had been experimented on only once and some of the employees, Sir, were contaminated.

-Time 07:36-08:20, Saddam: I want as soon as possible, if we are not transferring the weapons, to issue a clear order to the "concerned people" that the weapon should be in their hands ASAP. I might even give them a "non-return access." [Translator Comment: to have access to the weapons; to take them with them and not to return them]. I will give them an order stating that at "one moment," if I 'm not there and you don't hear my voice, you will hear somebody else's voice, so you can receive the order from him, and then you can go attack your targets. I want the weapons to be distributed to targets; I want Riyadh and Jeddah, which are the biggest Saudi cities with all the decision makers, and the Saudi rulers live there. This is for the germ and chemical weapons.

Husayn Kamil: In terms of chemical weapons, we have an excellent situation and good grip on them

[Translator Comment: they are in good control of them].

Saddam: Only in case we are obliged and there is a great necessity to put them into action. Also, all the Israeli cities, all of them. Of course you should concentrate on Tel Aviv, since it is their center.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, the best way to transport this weapon and achieve the most harmful effects would come by using planes, like a crop plane; to scatter it. This is, Sir, a thousand times more harmful. This is according to the analyses of the technicians (interrupted).

Saddam: We should consider alternatives Husayn (He called Husayn Kamil, Husayn). Meaning that if the planes don't arrive, then the missile will, and if the missile is intercepted, the plane will arrive.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, it is rare that the missiles are intercepted.

Saddam: Anyways, it is our duty to think of all the bad scenarios of this mission. Then Israel first, and if the Americans attack us with unconventional, harmful types of weapons, or at the moment we see it feasible to attack, but as for now, put Riyadh and Jeddah as targets.

Saddam: Air Force Commander [Muzahim Sa'b Hasan Muhammad Al Nasiri, at the time], you should coordinate with the Minister of Industry to get access to the weapons in the shortest time possible, of course with a lot of consideration for the technical and safety factors. Also, I want to give a written authorization to the "concerned people" that is signed by me, in case something happens to me. You know this is a life and death issue, all the orders about targets are sealed in writing and authenticated. Furthermore, for the officials from the missile (rockets) authority, you should coordinate with them so that they take the missile to locations. They are to inform the chief of staff, or operations commander deputy, to go to Husayn, Minister of Industry and go with the same necessary procedures. Regarding the chemical weapon [interrupted].

Husayn Kamil: We are really in good control of it sir.

Saddam: No, I mean it should be with the "taking action" people. [Translator Comment: the people who will execute the command; implementers.]

Husayn Kamil: Sir, the chemical is available and our establishment is the one responsible for commuting the weapon and supervising how it is used.

Saddam: Excellent. Do you have anything stocked in the establishment stores?

Husayn Kamil: We have (empty) heads but we also have production all over. Not only in the factories; it is scattered.

Saddam: I want you to keep in mind that by the 15th nothing should be stored in your factories that the "enemy" can have access to.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, the Ministry of defense should pull that "Stuff" out. The Ministry of defense already ordered 25% of that stuff. When and if they ask us for the rest, we will have no problem supplying it. Sir, we are in an excellent & prepared situation regarding the missile warheads and fighter's bombs. They are all modified and ready for launching any time, the chemical and the germ.

No conversation (sound of plates banging).

Saddam: Where are the most American forces and troops gathered and concentrated?

Speaker 2: Sir, it is in Khalid Military city "Madinat Khalid," located 60 kilometers past Hafr Al-Baten in Saudi, where the front General Command and Air Force Command are located. Most of the American army sectors, Sir, are by the coastal side in Al-Dammam, where most of the camp complexes exist.

Saddam: I want these big gatherings and complexes to be allocated properly and given to the Air Force commander to be added to the above targets of the germs weapons. This should be done by an order to Muzahim. This is by a direct order and it has the green light from me, since this mission doesn't fall into daily regular operations. I will issue a letter, signed by me, listing the commands and the alternative plans and probabilities of this mission, which should be followed literally.

Speaker 2: Sir, Economically important targets such as refineries, power plants & water reservoirs, should we include them in the mission?

Saddam: These locations should be put under the regular Air Force operations, and included in attacks not on this particular mission.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, these vital locations must be added to the mission and become priority targets to the biological & chemical weapons, because this will end all sorts of life. People are drinking water from these desalination plants and getting their fuel from refineries, thus ending the mission.

Saddam: Muzahim has already written these locations down and will take care of it, Refineries and [interrupted].

Muzahim: The Refineries and desalination plants, Sir.

Saddam: May God help us do it. Then there was no conversation.

Saddam: We will never lower our heads as long as we are alive, even if we have to destroy everybody.

The recording continues after this for a further 48 minutes, in which the participants discuss other military matters, such as senior command appointments and low-level defensive preparations. There was no further discussion of WMD.