

Ottoman Provincial Transformation in the Distribution of Power: The Tribulations of the Governor of Sivas in 1804 (A. H. 1219)

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This paper centers on a confiscation (*müsadere*) file I came across in the *Cendet-Maliye* collection of the Prime Minister's Archives (*Başbakanlık Arşivi*). The file had two significant features: First, the information it provided went beyond the often standardized confiscation record and contained, in addition, detailed narratives of the governor pasha, his retainers, and the appointed officials engaged in confiscation. Second, the full account captured the essence of Ottoman provincial transformation in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; the requirements of the sultan's officials, the plight of the governor pasha, and the strength of the provincial notables (*ayan*) highlighted the main issues of the period. My analysis focuses on these two significant features. First I let the historical actors narrate what happened in 1804 during the confiscation of the effects of the (now former) governor (*vahi*) of Sivas, Esseyid Elhac Mehmed Pasha. Then I locate this event within the larger context of Ottoman social transformation.

What follows is a concise summary of the report submitted by (*dergah-ı ali gedüklüsü zaim*) Mustafa Agha, who was sent from the sultan's court to execute the confiscation order. Mustafa Agha states:

At the presentation of the sultan's order (*emri şerif*), Mehmed Pasha immediately gave up the post, appointed Lutfullah Bey as his deputy (*mütesellim*), sent back the drum and standard (*tabl ve âlem*; symbols of his authority) to the location of munitions (*cebehane*), dismissed his soldiers, and turned over his treasury. As the items the pasha handed over were being registered, [however], the people of Sivas took the occasion to storm the residences of the pasha's household members (*dairesi halkı*)...saying, "We are owed this much by the pasha"; and not being satisfied with the pasha's claim that he only owed them 11,000 guruh (large silver coins),

they procured items from the palace and vowed not to return them until they were paid back in full. They stated that, according to their calculations, the pasha's debt was 57,000 gurush. In view of the violence, Mustafa Agha sent the pasha and his retainers to Tokat that night under the protection of Cebarzade's soldiers. Mustafa Agha [himself] remained in Sivas to guard the goods in his possession. The next day, however, once more some mischievous rabble incited the people who, thinking to take what was owed to them, attacked Mustafa Agha. While they took half of the goods and were in the process of seizing the other half, (*çuhadar-ı asafî*) Ahmed Agha, sent from the grand vizier's court with the sultan's order, arrived to confront them successfully. The two *aghas* sealed what remained of the goods and left for Tokat, to confer with the majordomo, treasurer, and scribe (*kethüda*, *hazinedar*, *hazine katibi*) of the pasha. When they met with the pasha and showed him the imperial orders, the pasha stated that "he had turned over whatever he had to the officials, and he would be satisfied to be left with nothing but the clothes on his back if that were the imperial command."

The pasha then goes on to give the following account:

He has no concealed jewels or goods. He had to finance all expenses out of his own funds [and is therefore in so much debt]... After spending ten months at the siege of Yafa, he spent six months in Diyarbekir and a month in transit; he had lived in Sivas for only three months... When he was previously appointed to Nablus, he was given a dagger by the grand vizier which he is ready to return if asked... Other than the dagger, he had a bejeweled cup holder (*mücevher zarfı*), an emerald seal ring (*zümrüd hatem*), and a gun stock (*kit'a kabza*), all of which he gave to Bashbug İnce Bey who had come to their rescue at the siege of Yafa... When the pasha was appointed to restore order in Diyarbekir, he had to pay the salaries of the newly recruited soldiers, and since he had no funds left, he gave his remaining valuables to the artisans of Diyarbekir to cover his debts. When he arrived in Sivas, because its revenues were small, the pasha had to keep his soldiers in the city for three months, as he could not [even] afford to have them sortee out.

The report continues with the accounts of the pasha's retainers:

The majordomo and treasurer, who had been in service for three months, concurred that the expenditures were truthful — that

there had been no money, and had there been anything, it would have gone to pay the debts.... These retainers and the pasha's scribe were questioned and pressured as necessary, but declared that during their three months service to the pasha, there had been nothing great or small but death and famine, and that they too had nothing in their possession.... The pasha's one female slave and guards were physically searched and nothing was discovered in their possession [either].

Then the officials report their final transactions:

Upon their return to Sivas, the officials met with no opposition. The people restored, with apologies, the goods they had seized. Because of the theft and plunder, the records were taken to Tokat¹ to be signed and sealed in the presence of the judge (*kadı*) and [then] sent to Constantinople.... The officials feel [however] the need to have an imperial order issued to Cebarzade Süleyman Bey concerning the [safe] transportation of the confiscated goods out of Sivas. Meanwhile, they [wait] in the house of Cebarzade and settle the affairs of the pasha.

The questions raised by this account can be focused on the people who provide the narratives: Was the delivery of confiscation orders by palace officials a common occurrence and, if so, why? What put the governor pasha in such dire straits? Why did the people of Sivas take the law into their own hands? How did Cebarzade Süleyman Bey, a very prominent provincial notable, figure in the whole incident? I shall now attempt to answer these questions, and thereby locate the unique case of Mehmed Pasha within the larger context of Ottoman social transformation in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

The Sultan's Officials and the Reign of Selim III

Military reforms and continuous campaigns seem to be prominent features of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Ottoman history. The need to replace the outdated mounted cavalry (due to the rise in the West

1 The records may have been taken to Tokat because of the location of the courthouse in Sivas: it was not at the house of the *kadı* but in the marketplace called the "court marketplace" — the location may have been too dangerous for the sultan's officials. Ömer Demirel, *II. Mahmud döneminde Sivas'ta Esnaf Teşkilatı ve Üretim-Tüketim İlişkileri*, Vol. 2 (Ankara 1986), 12.

of the professional army)² with new, professional units transformed the Ottoman financial and military system. Cash-generating leases gradually supplanted the fiefs³ to fund a centralized, salaried army. To make matters worse, this transformation was carried out during a period of almost continuous warfare: the Ottomans fought a total of *fourteen* wars⁴ in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,⁵ and more in the nineteenth. In addition, they put down many revolts in Anatolia and the Balkans.

The combination of rising military expenditures and escalating campaign costs permanently impaired the Ottoman budget. After 1748-1749 fiscal year, Ottoman state revenues started steadily to fall behind expenditure.⁶ The traditional methods that the Ottoman state employed to raise money were confiscation, compulsory donation, and currency debasement. During Selim III's reign, confiscations escalated in number as the fiscal crisis grew in severity. The crisis had reached

2 The military revolution introduced in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by Maurice of Orange, Gustavus Adolphus, and Wallenstein (infantry drill and line by the Dutchman, cavalry salvos and platoon system by the Swede, and unitary vertical command by the Czech) permanently altered the way wars were fought: Fatma Müge Göçek, "Toward a Theory of Westernization and Social Change: Ottoman Society in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries" (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1988), 158.

3 The Ottoman financial system was based on two assumptions: that wars would always be won and that war expenses would not be financed in cash. The Ottoman fief system was also based on these assumptions. The fief system, the sultan's treasury, and the Ottoman finances were undifferentiated; the Ottoman military, the sultan, and the state all had the same revenue base. In addition, the treasury was too small to meet war expenses; it could finance only limited projects.

4 These were the war with Crete (1645-1669), the war with Austria (1663-1676), the war with Poland (1672-1676), the war with Russia (1678-1681), the war with Austria, Russia, Poland, and Venice (1683-1699), the war with Russia, Austria, and Venice (1708), the war with Austria and Russia (1714-1718), the war with Austria and Russia (1797-1801), and the war with France (1797-1801); *ibid.*, 158-161.

5 These wars had disastrous negative effects. In the second half of the eighteenth century there was a precipitate drop in all economic production; the sultan, to recover his losses, increased taxation. As the Ottoman tax system was based on production, taxpayers responded by producing less, so the quantity and quality of goods and services in the empire declined rapidly: Mehmed Genç, "Onsekizinci yüzyılda Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Savaş," *Yapıt* (1984): 52-61.

6 In that year state expenditures were 395,161,620 akches (small silver coins; equal to approx. 3,293,014 guruh) and revenues were 380,908,300 akches (equal to approx. 3,174,236 guruh): Ahmed Tabakoğlu, "Onyedinci ve Onsekizinci yüzyıl Osmanlı Bütçeleri," *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 41 (1981): 388.

such a degree that when the soldiers demanded their salaries, the sultan stated that he "would gladly send his own revenues if there were any money in the treasury; he spent many sleepless nights thinking what to do."⁷

Esseyid Elhaç Mehmed Pasha and the Ottoman Governors

The position of the sultan's governors was no better; they too faced financial problems in procuring and maintaining their posts.⁸ A governor first had to bid for his post and pay large amounts in cash for it;⁹ he was then required to give gifts and pay tenure levies to retain the post.¹⁰ All these expenses made tax collection even more crucial to the upkeep of the governor and his household. Yet as the Ottoman state increasingly transformed land into a commodity and rented it out to raise cash for the new treasury, the governors' taxable land base shrank commensurately.¹¹ Military campaigns — such as those of our Mehmed Pasha to Yafa¹² and Diyarbekir,¹³ — also drained their coffers.¹⁴ The governors were eventually caught in a double bind

7 Karal quoted in Göçek, "Toward a Theory of Westernization," 159-162. Selim III had to finance most military reforms out of his own resources, since these new soldiers belonged to the *bostancı* corps, his select soldiers, and not to the Janissary corps: Enver Ziya Karal, *III. Selim in Hatt-ı Hümayunları* (Ankara 1946), 8.

8 After appointment to his post, a governor was assigned revenue sources for the duration of his tenure — mostly large fiefs and urban taxes. In return, the governor had to administer justly, maintain order, and collect taxes for his treasury.

9 For example, in the reign of sultan Mustafa III, the governor general (*beylerbeyi*) had to give one sable fur, one fully equipped horse, and 2,900 guruh in tax — plus an additional 14,500 guruh if there was a change in his appointment: Göçek, "Toward a Theory of Westernization," 284-8.

10 Karal, *III. Selim Hatt-ı Hümayunları*, 7.

11 Cengiz Orhonlu, "Osmanlı Teşkilatına ait Küçük bir Risale," *Belgeler* 4 (1967): 39-49.

12 Bonaparte conquered Yafa in late February 1799 but withdrew after the unsuccessful siege of Akka in May 1799. It was Ottoman governor Cezzar Ahmed Pasha who managed to defend the city with the aid of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers.

13 The inability of the sultan to finance additional troops led him to use the military retainers of official households as regular soldiers (*ibid.*, 174). Thus Mehmed Pasha himself had to finance the soldiers he raised in order to put down the Diyarbekir disturbances.

14 Following are the Sivas governors who preceded Mehmed Pasha: in 1799-1800 (1.5 months' service), Alaeddin Pasha; from 1800 to 1802, Köse Mustafa Pasha (who had to join the campaign immediately after his appointment and was subsequently appointed governor of Diyarbekir, a larger and more profitable governorship, as

principle, according to household size, they consistently fell short by at least 20 per cent. In the case of Sivas, the discrepancy was even more severe.¹⁹ In 1745, the Sivas governor received only 40 per cent of what he needed to maintain his household;²⁰ the rest he had somehow to find himself — something he and his successors, including Mehmed Pasha, failed to do.

Yet there were some governors who managed to be successful within this financially demanding system.²¹ Had Mehmed Pasha followed their model, he would have had either to levy additional duties (which may have been difficult with Cebbarzade controlling large parts of the region) or to invest in agriculture, industrial production, or urban property, or to engage in moneylending. Judging from the nature of his confiscated goods, however, consumption seems to have interested Mehmed Pasha more than investment; he had accumulated large amounts of textiles (for example, *lehkâri atlas*, *hindkâri kesme*, *misrikâri şayak*, *enguri şâli ve sof*), 28 fur coats (*kakum ve samur*), and enough goods to require 132 mules for transportation.

19 With Kütahya as the center, the Ottomani governorships in Asia and Anatolia were: Trabzon, Sivas, Konya, Maraş, Adana, Diyarbakır, Kars, Erzurum, Van, Musul, Baghdad, Kars, Halep, Trablus, Suriye, Akka, and Şam. Karal, *III. Selim'in Hatt-ı Hümayunları*, 5-6.

20 There were 1,200 people in the governor pasha's household, costing the pasha 84,000 guruh (the cost of maintaining each household member was estimated to be 70 guruh). Yet the amount of tax allocated to the pasha for the same year was 33,000 guruh: Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde*, 64; the figures are from the Prime Minister's Archives *Hazariyye Defteri* #: 180, 280-282.

21 The return from investments formed a large portion of some officials' incomes: the expense register of a grand vizier in 1764-1765 (Topkapı Archives, Defter #2823) indicates that only two-thirds of the vizier's revenues accrued from the sultan's allocations; the other one-third comprised his own investments. The nature of these economic activities varied. For example, Şehid Ali Pasha (Maliyeden Müdevver, #6266/402-20), around 1716, built, 11 soap manufactories in İsmir; the confiscated wealth of Esad Pasha, the governor of Damascus (Maliyeden Müdevver, #M9770/326), in 1863 included 54 looms of striped (*alaca*) cloth and 24 looms of silk-cotton (*kutni*) cloth, 2 inns, 236 shops, 42 vegetable gardens, 3 bathhouses, 7 farms, 20 houses, 2 mills, and 4 coffeehouses. The governor of Konya, Elhac Ali Pasha (Maliyeden Müdevver, #9725/525) similarly owned a wealth of buildings, land, and livestock near Constantinople. Others engaged in moneylending. Elhac Yusuf Pasha, governor of Jidda (Maliyeden Müdevver, #9725/257-9), left an estate that included 286,769 guruh in cash: from Göçek, "Toward a Theory of Westernization," 288.

between their households and their finances: as they collected fewer taxes, they could not maintain their large households¹⁵ and often lost their posts; yet they had to retain large households even though they had no revenues to support these households¹⁶ to increase their chances of attaining another post.¹⁷ Thus for these governors matters progressively worsened.

They reached such a point that the sultan had to raise new taxes to disburse additional cash stipends for the maintenance of the provincial governors and their households.¹⁸ Although these were distributed, in

a reward for his military success); in 1802, Zühdi İsmail Pasha (who had been incapable of putting down the disturbances in Diyarbakır and was therefore appointed to Sivas in retribution): Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol. 4 (İstanbul 1984; originally published 1863), 1833-1834; and in 1803, Alaeddin Pasha, on the death of Zühdi İsmail Pasha: Tabakoğlu, "Onyedi ve Onsekizinci yüzyıl," 96, 101. *Tarih-i Cevdet* records the appointment of Vizier Seyyid Abdurrahman Pasha in 1802 and then of Mustafa Pasha (upon whose death the governorship was given to his son Veliyüddin Bey); our Mehmed Pasha's appointment, which seems to have lasted only a few months, follows (though it is not mentioned in the chronicle).

15 The size of a governor's household ranged anywhere from a hundred to several thousand members. In the seventeenth century, the size of top-level administrators' households was between 300 and 1,000 members, not including their military retainers. In his attempt to control the potential power of the household, the sultan abolished its military attachment in 1827, and in 1829 he annulled the household retinue system.

16 It was very costly to maintain a household. One pasha (Kamil Kepeci, classification #7454) paid his 56 household *ağas* 11 guruh per month, while the orderlies received 6 guruh each; he also had a large private army of 241 men with their 5 officers, who received 9 guruh; all this before even figuring the maintenance cost of the rest of the household. The household members were also given periodic gifts during religious holidays and yearly supplies of cloth, robes, headgear, footwear, and some bonus (*balışış*). In 1795, the cash bonus given by a vizier (Cevdet Dahiliye, classification #11122) to his men reached 4,765 guruh. The second-largest source of expense was travel and campaigns: expenses increased five-to-tenfold, as documented by the travel expenses of a vizier (Maliyeden Müdevver, classification #2628/12-21) between Trebizond and Erzurum in the 1750s. During campaigns, the governors recruited soldiers from their provinces, in addition to their own household troops, thus increasing their expenses drastically. A vizier's expense register in 1808 (Cevdet Dahiliye, classification #15970) revealed approximately 2,500 men. Unable to recover his expenses, the official ended up in debt — mostly to provincial notables and artisans or the state.

17 Göçek, "Toward a Theory of Westernization," 281-286.

18 The amounts of cash provided for Sivas in the form of the new *seferiyye* and *hazariyye* taxes were: *hazariyye* — 15,000 guruh in 1736, 16,500 in 1768, 15,000 in 1771; *seferiyye* — 18,000 in 1736, 16,500 in 1768, and 18,000 in 1784. Yavuz Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunaltım ve Değişim Dönemi* (İstanbul 1986), 59.

The People of Sivas and Ottoman Society

During this period, the people of Sivas also suffered — from banditry, the misconduct of governors, and economic adversity. Their troubles started in the 1750s.²² In 1759 about 2,500 bandits (*levendat*) raided Sivas and the Keban and Ergani mines. Protests by the people of Sivas against their governors followed. The ruthlessness and overtaxation of Ahmed Pasha caused rebellions in 1761; three years later, the regimental leader of the succeeding governor, Feyzullah Pasha, was punished for collaborating with the bandits. The frequent wars crippled the productivity of the textile industries in Sivas and Tokat,²³ temporary setbacks in output became permanent, as the wars persisted throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.²⁴

The artisans of Sivas²⁵ were so financially troubled in 1802 that they urgently requested that the state lower their taxes from 882 guruhş per 1,000 units (based on the number of shops and amount of profits) to 690.²⁶ This may explain why the artisans (in our case the *duhanacı*, *meşinçi*, *sarrac*, *bezzaz*, and *kazzaz*) were so prominent among the “people of Sivas” who raided the possessions of Mehmed Pasha.²⁷ The

22 Necdet Sakaoğlu, *Anadolu Derebeyi Ocaklarından Kâse Paşa Hanedanı* (Ankara 1984), 27, 31, 96.

23 An 1827 survey of the artisans of Sivas demonstrated that textile production employed the largest number from among the approximately 3,350 craftspeople of the city, out of a total population of 18,170. This was due to Sivas's leading role in cotton and wool cloth production, which required artisans such as dyers (*boyacı*), cloth merchants (*bezzaz*), and makers of printed material (*hasmacı*). These artisans were divided into Muslims and non-Muslims almost equally, with 507 Muslim and 408 non-Muslim artisan groups: Demirel, *II. Mahmud*, 34-35, 81-82, 159.

24 For example, the Seven Years' War in Europe (1758-1763) prevented the import of indigo blue dye (*çivâd*) causing a decline in Tokat's raw silk output: Genç, “17.-19. Yüzyıllarda,” 149-151, 158-159. Just as the industry was starting to recover after the war, the Ottoman-Russian war caused a further setback and production never again reached its former level.

25 In the main marketplace, there were 24 markets (*çarşı*), 4 bazaars (*pazar*), 14 inns (*han*), 2 tanneries (*debağhane*), 3 wax factories (*mumhane*), 5 dye-houses (*boyahane*), 82 mills (*değirmen*), and five bathhouses (*hamam*) in Meydan, Kale, Hasan Paşa, Çay and Kurşunlu, *ibid.*, 30, 32.

26 This was finally conceded by the state in 1833-1834, in spite of its dire need for cash. In the period 1810-1840, the decline in the number of shops reached an all-time high, causing a reduction in the number of artisans and in tax revenues: *ibid.*, 98, 101.

27 There is no correspondence between the people's occupations and what they seized, except for the grocers (*bakkat*), who went for dry goods, and butchers (*kasab*), who seized mules. Grocers led the group of looters; the total value of the effects they seized

Tokat court records²⁸ also indicate that between 1802 and 1805 (the exact period of Mehmed Pasha's troubles), the prices of goods, food, livestock and property increased significantly. The presence among the looters of some notables (such as *Tirkeşzade Mehmed ağa*, *Hacı Osmanzade*, *Emirzade*, *Hoca Efendizade*), and even a functionary or two (*katib-i mahkeme Mehmed efendi*, *Müftü efendi*, *kısır kapusu mahallesi imamı kadı hacı Ebubekir efendi*) may thus be due to the city's severe economic distress at the time.²⁹

Cebbarzade Süleyman Bey and Provincial Dynasties

The transformations that during Selim III's reign severely hurt the governors and artisans also fostered the rise of another group. Provincial notables (*ayan*) so consolidated their positions that some families — the Pasvandoğlu, Karaozmanzade and Cebbarzade being among the most prominent — formed dynasties. They retained power for several generations because of the Ottoman state's urgent need for efficient cultivation, taxation and control at the provincial level.³⁰ The provincial dynasties engaged in a wide spectrum of activities; they acted as tax farmers, traded with the West,³¹ invested in urban property

was 4,504 guruhş, followed by butchers (2,250), *tabl esnafı* (2,250), *çerçi* (peddlers) (1,647) and cart makers or drivers (*arabacı*) (1,421). Regarding the value of seized goods among the individuals, an unspecified *beyefendi* (maybe Cebbarzade?) led with goods valued at 1,056 guruhş, with İbrahim Çavuş second (969), and *kuruşulu hamamcısı* (900) third. Nor were the looters usually prominent among the pasha's registered creditors. But the cooks (*aşçı*), and orderlies (*karakulluğu*) among the crowd were probably the pasha's household members whose salaries may have been in arrears.

28 Mustafa Öztürk, “Tokat'ta Fiatlar: 1772-1823” in *Türk Tarihinde ve Türk Kültüründe Tokat*, Bolay, Hayri et al., eds (Ankara 1987), 184-211.

29 In all, a group of between 200 and 500 people impounded 213 items with a total value of 31,818 guruhş — about half (57,452 guruhş) of the pasha's actual debts.

30 Of the 400,000 janissaries registered during the reign of Selim III, only 60,000 were active, and of those, only 25,000 participated in campaigns: Karal *III. Selim'in Hatt-ı Hümayunları*, 8-9.

31 Those with access to the Aegean shores carried on a brisk trade with the West beyond the sultan's control; the frequency of the eighteenth-century edicts (dated 1755, 1747, 1755, 1763, 1765, 1778, 1781, 1782) on this subject demonstrates how rampant this trade had become: Yücel Özkaya, *Onsekizinci yüzyılda Osmanlı Kurumları ve Osmanlı Toplum Yaşantısı* (Ankara 1985), 325-327.

and moneylending, raised troops to provide security,³² and were then appointed to more and more administrative posts by the Ottoman state, both by way of rewards and to enhance control.

The unprecedented concentration of power in the provinces is reflected in land lease distributions of the time. In 1794, of the 6,000 *timar* and *zeamet* administered by the new treasury (İrad-ı Cedid Hazinesi),³³ more than half were farmed out to only seven people; the same ratio persisted ten years later.³⁴ — and our Cebbarzade Süleyman Bey was among those seven.³⁵ He was a leading member of the Cebbarzade dynasty, also referred to as Cabarzade, Çaparzade, or Çapanoğlu.³⁶ Süleyman Bey served the Ottoman state in various administrative capacities and received frequent favors from the sultan.

32 When a governor pasha perished in the wars, his soldiers and large household would take to the mountains, making the protection provided by local notables even more significant: Sakaoğlu, *Anadolu Derebeyi*, 30. Population increases and the movement of tribes throughout Anatolia also contributed to the social unrest.

33 Hence by 1793 the single-treasury tradition of the Ottoman Empire had been destroyed: Karal, *III. Selim'in Hatt-ı Hümayunları*, 83-87; by the late nineteenth century, the respective economic resources of the state, the sultan, and the military had become totally separated. As a result, the treasuries were compartmentalized and brought together under one single treasury: Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde*, 151-153. This was the beginning of the end of the sultan's economic dominance; as he funded new projects out of his own treasury, his resources shrank to such a point that in 1840 his expenses exceeded his revenues and he became insolvent. The state delivered the final blow in 1894; it transferred all the sultan's revenues to the newly created united treasury, and instead allocated, "an appropriate salary from the treasury to the sultan." *ibid.*, 289.

34 These seven were Yusuf Ziya Pasha, the governor of Erzurum; Cebbarzade Süleyman Bey, *mutasarrıf* of Bozok; Süleyman Ağa, the *muhassıl* of Canik and *voyvoda* of Karahisar-ı Şarki; Elhac Memiş Efendi, from a family of religious officials and/or scholars (*hacoglan*); Kara Osmanzade Elhac Ömer Ağa, the *mütesellim* of Manisa; Kara Osmanzade Ağa; and Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, the *mutasarrıf* of Yanya. In 1804, of the total 3,575 *timar* and *zeamet*, 1,974 (55%) were in the hands of six people: *ibid.*, 179.

35 Stanford Shaw, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807* (Cambridge, Mass. 1971), 215; Yücel Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Ayanlık* (Ankara 1977), 20; Sakaoğlu, *Anadolu Derebeyi*, 14-15.

36 Before him, another Cebbarzade, Mustafa Bey, was the *mutasarrıf* of Bozok and the *voyvoda* of Yeni il in 1782, and Süleyman Bey assumed these leases (*malikanes*) on the former's death for a total cost of 1,900,000 gurus (Maliyeden Müdever, #9741/108-9). His son became a significant Ottoman administrator, Vizier Celaleddin Pasha: Sakaoğlu, *Anadolu Derebeyi*, 15. The Cebbarzades performed significant services for the Ottoman state. For example, in 1779, they were asked to provide the necessary potassium nitrate (*güherçile*) for the Constantinople powder mill (*baruthane*); in 1785 they were asked to punish the notables in Anatolia who were

for his attempts to establish a branch of the new military (Nizam-ı Cedid) corps in Anatolia;³⁷ he was also one of the signatories of the 1808 Deed of Agreement (Sened-i İttifak).³⁸ It is therefore understandable that the sultan's officials sent to confiscate Mehmed Pasha's possessions not only stayed in Cebbarzade's dwelling but asked his protection in removing the confiscated goods from Sivas.

To conclude, then, this unique historical document, including the narratives of those engaged in the action, illuminates for us yet another dimension of the complex historical transformation of the Ottoman Empire. Only by locating large-scale social processes in specific historical instances can scholars identify and interpret the impact of historical social change on societies and the social actors.

conspiring with bandits and also to collect the poll taxes (*cizye*) that had been in arrears; and later, in 1798, they were requested to assist the Ottoman forces in putting down the rebellion in Rumeli (*Dağlı isyanları*). The Cebbarzade dynasty also held the *mutasarrıf* and *mütesellim* positions of Bozok for thirty years: Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Ayanlık*, 149-153.

37 In 1806, his increasing power vis-à-vis Selim III brought him into conflict with Tayyar Pasha, head of another Anatolian family, the Canikli dynasty. Selim III gave Süleyman Pasha the *sancak* of Amasya, in return for his support of the Nizam-ı Cedid corps. But Tayyar Pasha was against the new military corps and also resented losing Amasya: Karal, *III. Selim'in Hatt-ı Hümayunları*, 55. Süleyman Bey ultimately led an expedition against Tayyar Pasha when the possibility arose of Tayyar Pasha allying himself with Russia. Tayyar Pasha established a base in Sinop in 1805 with a garrison of 50,000 men; then, with an army of equal size he captured some cities before being defeated by Süleyman Pasha. He was then pardoned by Selim III: Shaw, *Between Old and New*, 284-285, 398.

38 Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, Vol. 5, 4th ed. (Ankara 1983), 80. The sultan agreed with the *ayan* on mutual support, conferred titles upon them and rights on their children; he ratified the agreement but the state was also a party to it, once more highlighting the state-sultan legal distinction. The dominance of these provincial dynasties waned with the establishment of a new centralized state officialdom comprising a salaried personnel. Confiscations and forced taxation seem to have aided the gradual disintegration of these provincial dynasties. Most historians argue that the influence of the dynasties declined considerably with the centralization of power, during the reign of Mahmud II in the 1830s: Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netayic-ül-Vukuat*, vols. 3-4 (Ankara 1980; originally published 1877); Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Ayanlık*; and Sakaoğlu, *Anadolu Derebeyi*. Nagata claims that their power continued through the nineteenth century, only changing shape and influencing strictly provincial matters: Yuzo Nagata, *Muhsinzade Mehmed Paşa ve Ayanlık Müessesesi* (Tokyo 1976). It is probable that the dynasties' position of strength was transient and that they were gradually coopted into the Ottoman administrative system.

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Contents

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INTRODUCTION	7
TOWNS	11
Kubra Aliyeva	13
İnci Enginün	19
Fatma Müge Göçek	31
Nedim Gürsel	42
Yitzhak Kerem	49
Rachel Milstein	62
Nenad Močanin	70
Karin Rührdanz	75
Mária Sándor	84
Uziel O. Schmelz	93
Mahmoud Yazbak	114
Dror Ze'evi	126
EARLY OTTOMAN HISTORY	143
Sina Akşin	145
Keith Hopwood	154
Nejat Göyünç	162

The Role of the Tabriz School in the Development of Art in Ottoman Turkey
Ahmet Midhat Efendi'nin Gözüyle İstanbul [Istanbul from Ahmet Midhat's Perspective]
Ottoman Provincial Transformation in the Distribution of Power: The Tribulations of the Governor of Sivas in 1804 (A. H. 1219)
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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	167
Dimitri Kitsikis	
Le concept de relations internationales et le service diplomatique ottoman au XIXe siècle	169
Jan Schmidt	
The Herklots Affair, 1893: A Case Study in Capitalism and Power Politics in the Hijaz	176
Eliezer Tauber	
Some New Facts on Ottoman Counterespionage in the Levant during World War I	193
LITERARY, ADMINISTRATIVE AND OTHER SOURCES	209
Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont	
Memorial of the Ottoman Society through the Funerary Steles of Sinop	211
Yehoshua Ben-Arieh	
Settlements and Population of the <i>Sancak</i> of Jerusalem in the 1870s	218
Eleazar Birnbaum	
Turkish Collective Biographical Manuscripts in Cairo University Library: Works by Müstakimzâde Süleymân Sa'deddin and Other Scholars from Ottoman Cities	263
Lawrence I. Conrad and Barbara Kellner-Heinkele	
Ottoman Resources in the Khalidi Library in Jerusalem	280
Arnold H. Green	
Parish Registers as a Source of Data on Late Ottoman Palestine	294
Avner Levi	
Yakov Yona'nın Delediği Türk Atasözleri [Turkish Proverbs Collected by Yakov Yona]	304
Hüsamettin Mehmedov	
1140/1727 yılı tarihli Gence ve Tiflis eyaletleri "mufassal defter"lerine göre Osmanlı yönetiminde konar-göçerler. [Nomads under Ottoman Rule, based on the 1140/1727 <i>mufassal defterleri</i> of the provinces of Gence and Tiflis]	313
Michael Winter	
An Arabic and A Turkish Chronicler from the Beginning of Ottoman Rule in Egypt: A Comparative Study	318
ENGLISH SUMMARIES OF TURKISH ARTICLES	327
CONTRIBUTORS	331