SEN, ETHICS, AND DEMOCRACY

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ABSTRACT
Amartya Sen’s ethical theorizing helps feminists resolve the tensions between the claims of women’s particular perspectives and moral objectivity. His concept of “positional objectivity” highlights the epistemological significance of value judgments made from particular social positions, while holding that certain values may become widely shared. He shows how acknowledging positionality is consistent with affirming the universal value of democracy. This article builds on Sen’s work by proposing an analysis of democracy as a set of institutions that aims to intelligently utilize positional information for shared ends. This epistemological analysis of democracy offers a way to understand the rationale for reserving political offices for women. From a political point of view, gendered positions are better thought of as an epistemological resource than as a ground of identity politics—that is, of parochial identification and solidarity.

KEYWORDS
Amartya Sen, democracy, epistemology, feminism, objectivity, universality, ethics

INTRODUCTION
People evaluate things from multiple points of view. Sometimes they evaluate something from their individual point of view, considering how it bears on their personal interests, projects, or welfare. At other times, they evaluate it from various wider points of view—for example, they consider how it bears on the interests, projects, or welfare of their family, firm, ethnic group, country, or humanity as a whole. Following through on the spatial metaphor embodied in talk of “points of view,” let us say that an evaluative perspective is “local” or “parochial” if it is taken up by one or a few people, “more global” if it is shared by larger groups, and “global” (without qualification) or “universal” if it is or could be shared by everyone. One of the tasks of moral philosophy is to theorize the relations among these evaluative perspectives.

There are two broad types of strategy for coming to terms with the multiplicity of evaluative differences due to variations in perspective. One strategy, adopted most commonly by nonfeminist philosophers, regards local evaluative perspectives as sources of bias, error, or intolerable conflict.
It strives to *reduce* evaluative perspectives to a small number – typically only to the individual (self-interested) and moral (universal) points of view (Thomas Nagel 1978; Richard Brandt 1979; Henry Sidgwick 1981). It then tries to *subsume* one under the other, either by deriving the moral point of view from the self-interested bargaining of individuals (David Gauthier 1986), or by arguing that the moral point of view has authority over the individual point of view (Immanuel Kant 1981). The moral point of view is often achieved by *abstracting* from individual differences—for example, deriving it from people’s choices behind a “veil of ignorance” in which individuals don’t know their differences from others (John Rawls 1971).

The second strategy, adopted more commonly by feminist philosophers, regards the plurality of evaluative perspectives in a more epistemological vein. It sees such variations not simply as sources of error and bias to be eliminated or transcended through abstraction, but as *information resources* for *constructing* more global points of view through their critical interaction (Sandra Harding 1993; Helen Longino 1993). It focuses on the *irreducibly* numerous, intersecting ways people’s social positions—of wider scope than the individual, but narrower than all of humanity (as of gender, race, ethnicity, class, and so forth)—affect their points of view. Instead of seeking one point of view that has authority over all the rest, it views the authority of different points of view in pragmatic terms. The solutions to different problems require different evaluative information, which is accessible only from certain perspectives. To solve some problems, we must think “locally.” To solve others, we must construct more global perspectives from which different sorts of evaluative information are accessible. The more global perspectives represent contingent achievements for particular purposes.

The pragmatic—epistemological strategy for dealing with the multiplicity of evaluative perspectives generates several questions. (1) Is there any sense in which local evaluative positions can claim to be objective? (2) What reasons do we have for constructing more global perspectives? (3) What are the information requirements for solving the problems that we see from a more global perspective? (4) How do institutions differ with respect to their ability to marshal the perspectival information needed to solve our problems? (5) How can institutions dedicated to solving more global problems take advantage of the information resources of local points of view?

Amartya Sen’s ethical thought helps us answer these questions. He shows us how to apply the concept of objectivity to value judgments made from local positions. At the same time, he recognizes that we often seek more global points of view to work out solutions to problems we share. His ethical thought helps us analyze the information requirements for solving such problems, and the epistemic capacities of institutions we might use to solve them. These concerns underlie Sen’s capability approach to measuring
development, and his discussion of the relative merits of authoritarian states, democratic states, and markets for dealing with the problem of famine. Democracy plays a central role in Sen’s ethics. His arguments for the universal value of democracy fit into a conception of democracy as a way of constructing a more global point of view out of more local points of view. I shall show how his work on the epistemological value of social identities helps us understand the point of policies for increasing the participation of women in representative assemblies, in ways complimentary to feminist approaches, and thereby helps advance feminist ethics.

I. POSITIONAL (LOCAL) AND TRANS-POSITIONAL (GLOBAL) OBJECTIVITY

Let us begin our exploration of evaluative perspectives with a consideration of the vexed question of whether any such perspectives can be “objective.” “Objectivity” is usually linked to universality: a judgment is said to be objective if and only if everyone would accept that judgment, regardless of their location, if they reasoned consistently from the available evidence and arguments. The core idea is that of interpersonal invariance of judgment. Amartya Sen (1993b: 126) has argued that the concept of objectivity as interpersonal invariance can be extended by relativizing it to a position. A judgment about an object is positionally objective if anyone in that position would accept the same judgment. Observation statements provide the clearest illustration of a positionally objective judgment. “The Sun and Moon appear to be of the same size,” is interpersonally invariant for observers standing on Earth, but not for observers in most other positions in space. Many parameters besides spatial location can affect a person’s judgment of an object, including the person’s background beliefs and attitudes, cognitive limitations, personal relations to the object, and so forth. One could say of any judgment that it is positionally objective if anyone standing in the same position (affected by the same parameters) would make the same judgment. This would not make the judgment true, but at best warranted relative to the perhaps limited or defective parameters defining that position.

The concept of positional objectivity is particularly useful as applied to value judgments, because value judgments are essentially “perspectival” in ways that other judgments are not. Call a judgment “perspectival” if it essentially asserts a relation to someone’s point of view, as constituted by her mental states of perceiving, feeling, and willing. The contents of some judgments, such as “2 + 2 = 4,” or “electrons have negative charge” are not perspectival, for they do not essentially involve any mental states. By contrast, value judgments essentially lay a normative claim on people’s mental states, directing them to feel, desire, or deliberate in certain ways with respect to the valued object. Value claims, then, are perspectival in that
they essentially assert a relation between the valued object and an agent’s will or emotion.

Because different people often stand in different positions relative to the same objects, it often makes sense for them to value these objects in different ways. It makes sense for the Brazilian football team and its fans to wish for and be elated at Brazil’s victory over the German team, even while the same event reasonably disappoints the German team and its fans. “Brazil’s victory over Germany is a disappointment” is a positionally objective judgment for anyone affiliated with the German team, but not for those affiliated with the Brazilian team. Many emotions and attitudes, such as loyalty, pride, love, and enmity, are characteristically local in this way: their warranting conditions are relative to social positions that cannot be occupied by everyone, since the positions are defined against contrasting social locations (member vs. nonmember, partner vs. rival, friend vs. stranger or enemy, and so forth).

Such cases of positionally objective but interpersonally varying valuations are not troubling, because there is good reason for people to occupy the different positions from which it makes sense for them to value the same things in different ways. Some positions, however, ought not to be occupied at all (except perhaps notionally, as an exercise in understanding). Given the racist beliefs of the Nazis, contempt for Jews made sense. But the cognitive position of the Nazis was not one that could bear critical scrutiny, shaped as it was by lies, distortions, and pseudo-science. That their position could not bear critical scrutiny is a universally objective judgment, one that even the Nazis would have had to accept had they viewed the evidence and arguments impartially.2

Appreciating the perspectival character of value does not presuppose that each agent’s position is singular or fixed. An individual often stands in multiple relations to the same object, and so may have mixed feelings about it. As a patriotic citizen, a woman may support her nation’s war effort, including the draft that takes her son, even though as a loving mother, she dreads her son’s being drafted. People often have reason to change their position. Some such reasons are cognitive, as when people discover that their valuation is warranted only relative to a factually erroneous position. Others are motivational. Let us focus on motives people may have for seeking a shared, trans-positional, more global evaluative position. I would like to distinguish four such motives: ascriptive identification, sympathy, practical identification, and respect.

Ascriptive identification with others, seeing them as extensions of oneself—as tied by relations of birth, such as of kinship, ethnicity, race, and caste, or related in some other socially ascribed way, as sharing a common language, culture, or religion—can be a powerful source of shared positioning. Identification on the basis of such ascriptive identities may motivate loyalty, solidarity, and attachments to the in-
group members which take the form of feeling group members’ joy, pain, pride, and indignation as one’s own.

Sympathy is a motive for taking up the perspective of others that is distinct from and of wider scope than identification (Amartya Sen 2000b). It can lead people to evaluate the world through the eyes of others whom we do not identify as extensions of ourselves. Martha Nussbaum (1999: 29) describes the predicament of Metha Bai, a young Indian widow who hates the caste system because, in forbidding her from working outside the home, it threatens her and her children’s survival. Sympathy for Metha Bai can lead Nussbaum’s comfortably situated academic readers to share Bai’s hatred of the caste system, although we do not imagine that her pain is our own, or that we share a common socially ascribed position that makes us vulnerable to the same threats. As Max Scheler (1954: 14) has stressed, the truly sympathetic person is vividly aware that the pain that arouses her concern is someone else’s pain, not a pain felt by the sympathizer herself, and that the concern so aroused is for another person, not for an extended “me” or for “us.” Sympathy is distinct from the egoism of an extended self.

Practical identification occurs when people see themselves as members of the same collective agency—as participants in a common cooperative enterprise such as a firm or interest group, in a shared practice such as a hobby, sport, or artistic endeavor, or as committed to living and hence reasoning together about what to do, as in a democracy. Practical identification need not rely on prior ascriptive identification. People of many different ascriptive identities of race, gender, ethnicity, religion, and the like may join forces in common projects. Indeed, perhaps the defining feature of globalization is its transcendence of ascriptive identities, especially national and ethnic identities, as a ground of cooperation. While global markets are a major social context for forging trans-ascriptive practical identities, science, art, athletics, and nongovernmental organizations also play major roles. The key point is that to engage in effective cooperation (as opposed to coerced coordination, as in a slave labor system), people must construct a shared point of view from which reasons are assessed.

Respect involves recognizing and valuing others by acting only for reasons that they can reasonably accept as a permissible basis for anyone similarly situated to act. It is to commit oneself to act only on principles that can be reasonably shared by those one respects. In Kantian and neo-Kantian versions of respect, this attitude is owed to all rational agents (Kant 1981). Respect differs from sympathy. When one acts out of sympathy for another, the aim of one’s action is the other’s good. When one acts out of respect, the other’s good places a constraint on what one may do in pursuit of one’s own aims, but one’s own ultimate aims need not be devoted to the other’s good.
While not exhaustive, these four motives cover most of the grounds people have for sharing reasons and evaluations, for coming to occupy a common position from which to evaluate actions or the world, and thereby for expanding the scope of interpersonal invariance—the degree of objectivity—of a value judgment. They differ, however, in their potential for forming the basis of a fully universal or global evaluative position comprehending all of humanity. Ascriptive identification has no such potential. Ascriptive identities are necessarily parochial, since they are defined through contrast with outgroups. By contrast, it is not unreasonable to hope for and even demand universal respect and sympathy for others. Certain cooperative organizations, such as international human rights movements, which are bound by practical identification motivated by respect and sympathy for humans generally, may be effective vehicles for cultivating and institutionalizing respect and sympathy on a global scale.

Yet even universal value judgments do not escape the perspectival character of value judgments. In the realm of values, there is no “view from nowhere.” Universal value judgments reflect instead the “view from everywhere”—a position capacious enough that all can reasonably occupy it, and perhaps can reasonably be expected to occupy. Without denying this, I shall henceforth reserve the unqualified term “positional” for local or parochial perspectives.

II. INFORMATION ANALYSIS OF EVALUATIVE PERSPECTIVES: CAPABILITY ASSESSMENTS

The expansion of motives of sympathy and respect to include people across the world has given many people a shared interest in promoting development worldwide. To the extent that we share this interest, the destitution, suffering, and oppression of individuals in far-flung parts of the globe is a problem not simply for those individuals but for us. It is something we must take responsibility for through our collective efforts, as channeled through various organizations that aim to advance development. To coordinate our efforts toward this common aim requires that we adopt a more global perspective from which to evaluate development. Which perspective should we choose?

Every evaluative perspective is sensitive to certain kinds of information about what it evaluates, and insensitive to others. For example, measures of development in terms of income alone are sensitive to people’s access to marketed goods, but insensitive to other goods, such as freedom of association and the right to vote in democratic elections, that are not commodities. The choice of what perspective we should choose, then, is partly justified by consideration of what information we ought to be sensitive to. This epistemic judgment is, in turn, grounded in the constitutive aim of our cooperative efforts—in this case, of development.
The precise specification of this aim depends on the background motives of sympathy and respect that prompt us to adopt it in the first place. That is, we need assessments of development that are sensitive to the normative demands of sympathy and respect for all.

This pragmatic–epistemological approach to evaluation underwrites Sen’s so-called “capability” perspective on human development (Amartya Sen 1985, 1993a), which constitutes his most important and distinctive contribution to the foundations of welfare economics. Sen defines “capabilities” as freedoms to achieve valuable “functionings.” “Functionings” are states of the person that constitute or advance her well-being or agency, such as health, adequate nourishment, literacy, and participation in community life. He champions capabilities as superior to other standards of development, such as subjective utility and income, partly on the ground that the “information bases” of the latter exclude important dimensions of development that are captured by capabilities (Amartya Sen 1999b: 56–76). For example, as noted above, income measures fail to consider the role of non-commodity values, such as rights, liberties, and social recognition, in people’s well-being. They are also correlated to a surprisingly poor degree with other important goods, such as longevity (Sen 1999b: 21–3).

Subjective utilities, the standard measure of welfare in economic theory, suffer from additional information defects. Contemporary economists measure utility in terms of individual preference satisfaction. Utility measures are deeply positional, immediately tied to the individual agent’s parochial and idiosyncratic view of the world. They are so positional that they do not permit interpersonal utility comparisons. This makes them ill-suited to inform practical projects grounded in sympathy for others, because sympathy directs our helping efforts to more urgent cases—those more disadvantaged, or more in need, within a given domain of concern. To identify those cases, we need welfare assessments that support interpersonal comparisons.

Utility measures also fail to deal effectively with the ways people adapt their preferences to circumstances of deprivation and oppression. If individuals, due to poverty or lack of freedom, have no hope of achieving some valuable functioning, or would be punished if they tried to achieve it, they may give up the desire to achieve that functioning so as to avoid frustration and suffering. Or they may never form such a desire if they are deprived of knowledge of that functioning or how to achieve it. From the perspective of utility, where there is no desire, there is no unsatisfied desire. So utility measures fail to register deprivations as such, to the extent that the poor and downcast have adapted to them.

In fact, all welfare measures that rely on the subjective valuing of individuals fall prey to the problem of adaptation to deprivation. Sen illustrates this point with the case of subjective reports of health. Men are far more likely than women to complain of poor health in India, even
though women have higher rates of morbidity (Sen 1993b: 135). This is partly due to the fact that Indian women have lower rates of literacy and overall education than men. They therefore have lower access to the information needed to enable them to recognize their bodily states as symptoms—that is, as signs of poor health potentially correctable by medical treatment. It may also be partly due to the fact that many women accept gender inequality as a "normal" or inevitable condition of life, so do not expect or demand more than they have. They have adjusted both their feelings and their preferences to their lower expectations.

Recognition of these causes of a positional assessment give us, and the women themselves, reason to seek a position beyond their immediate local one from which to assess their well-being. The first cause shows how their position is conditioned by medical ignorance. This gives everyone a reason to seek a better informed perspective. The second cause shows how their position is caused by an ignorance of possibilities of gender equality, which again gives them, and us, a reason to seek a more informed perspective.

These reflections give us reason not only to move beyond the positional health assessments of individuals themselves, which are relative to their varying levels of knowledge and adaptation to deprivation, but to construct a trans-positionally invariant or global point of view from which to assess people’s health. For the background interest that motivates the quest for interpersonal health comparisons is a shared project in advancing human well-being, motivated by sympathy for others. Because this is a collective project, it requires a shared standard of assessment to be advanced. To the extent that it is a fully global project, it requires a universal standard. Sen’s capability approach, in taking objectively assessed health status as a valuable functioning for everyone, meets this requirement of universality.

This account limits the authority of the capability perspective to particular shared purposes and motivations. It does not deny that, for other purposes, subjective utilities can be very important. To the extent that individuals are acting simply on their own account and within the constraints of morality, they have good reason to act on their local valuations (at least when these are not based on factual errors or ignorance). Moreover, respect for others gives us reason to ensure that individuals have the freedom to act on their local valuations.

III. INFORMATIONAL ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS: THE CASE OF FAMINE

The same informational analysis that helps us choose the appropriate evaluative perspective from which to guide our actions for different purposes can also be used to help us choose the best institutions through which to pursue our purposes. As we have seen, practical problems can be partially specified in terms of the information needed to identify, evaluate,
and solve them. Because they are identified pragmatically, in terms of what needs or ought to be done, their information basis involves value judgments. We can therefore ask how positional or local are the value judgments that form the information basis of the solutions to the problems at issue, and how effectively different institutions are able to utilize information from those positions. The answer to this question will go far in determining which institutions ought to be charged with the task of solving the problem in question, and how they ought to be designed to utilize the necessary information.

Sen takes this epistemic approach to evaluating institutions in his famous comparisons of the performance of markets, authoritarian states, and democratic states with respect to the problem of preventing famines. In his classic study of famine, Sen (1981) argued that aggregate declines in food availability are not the fundamental cause of famine. Rather, famine is caused by a severe decline in the entitlements of a subset of the population in a region—that is, a decline in their command over income or other legal means by which they can acquire food. His analysis points to a defect in the information basis of markets, relative to the problem of famine. The force of preference information ("demand") in a market setting is conveyed by the money backing it up. Thus, the needs and wants of the poor register faintly in markets. Because famines are caused by a shortfall in entitlements, those suffering the shortfall lack the means to signal their needs in an open food market. Free markets, all by themselves, lack sensitivity to the information needed to prevent famine, and so cannot be counted on to do so.

Sen also faults the performance of authoritarian states with respect to famine prevention on epistemic grounds. He cites the contrasting experiences of democratic India and communist China in preventing famine. India’s last famine took place in 1944, when India was still under British imperial rule. The institution of democracy ended famine there, despite the persistence of great poverty and periodic shocks leaving segments of the population without the means to buy food. It did so because public pressure facilitated by the publicity offered by a free press induced the state to adopt policies enabling the dispossessed to make up the shortfall in food entitlements (Sen 1999b: 180–1). By contrast, China suffered a devastating famine in 1959–60, despite Mao’s desire to achieve food security for Chinese peasants. Communist party officials assigned to agriculture faced overwhelming incentives to exaggerate performance to their superiors. Neither the press nor the public were free to report on starvation in remote districts. So the Chinese state, lacking free speech and transparency to the public, didn’t even know what it was doing. Without the feedback needed to determine whether its policies were working, it pressed on dogmatically with its agricultural plans, with disastrous results (Sen 1999b: 181–2).
The key difference between democratic India and communist China was not in their ends. Both wanted to ensure food security for their populations. It lay in their ability to learn from their mistakes, to adjust policies in light of information about how they were doing. A regime based on hierarchy, secrecy, unquestioning obedience, and punishment for bearers of bad news has an institutional structure that embodies dogmatism and self-ignorance. A democratic regime based on participation, transparency, freedom of speech, and accountability has an institutional structure that enables learning and adjustment of action in light of this information.

Sen admits that his instrumental argument does not show that existing democracies are fully responsive to policy failures (Sen 1999b: 154–6). While they have prevented famine, many have done far less well in preventing malnourishment, poverty, and other chronic capability deprivations. Here too, an informational analysis of the difficulties democracies face in responding to these problems is illuminating. Sen observes that the causes and consequences of these problems are harder to understand and more difficult to politicize. Adaptive preferences and feelings also play a significant role in this failure. Dramatic change for the worse arouses public complaint and demands for public action, because it violates expectations. But continuous deprivation is something to which people inure themselves. Only a vivid awareness of the feasibility of alternatives inspires dissatisfaction with “normal” states of chronic deprivation. The poor state of public education in many democracies, which leaves so many people illiterate or ill-informed, contributes to their lack of awareness of alternatives and hence quiescence on these issues. For these reasons, and others to be discussed at the end of this paper, many democratic states receive weak signals about these chronic unmet needs.

The case of famine shows that there are some problems whose recognition and solution require shifting from a highly positional or local point of view to a more global point of view. Democracy is a way to construct such a shared point of view. The more global point of view does not eliminate the need to get access to widely dispersed, local information. A state-run famine relief program needs to know who needs relief. But the local information required must be cast in a form deemed relevant from the more global perspective. The people entitled to relief are not simply those who are dissatisfied with their access to food—this would indulge spoiled gourmards, and neglect those so starved to exhaustion that they no longer desire and hope—but those who, from the more global capability perspective, lack adequate nutrition. This is why the public and the press need to aim to speak from what they take to be a shared position, one they put forth as a worthy location from which citizens should speak. Democratic discussion is a means through which we forge such a position.
IV. DEMOCRACY AS A UNIVERSAL VALUE

Sen’s epistemic argument for the crucial role of democratic states in preventing famines reflects a broader understanding of democracy as an institutional embodiment of collective reasoning and experimentation over how we should live together. This conception of democracy as a collective engagement in practical reason – that is, reasoning about what to do – lies at the heart of Sen’s arguments for the universal value of democracy. Reason, as this term is used here, is no metaphysical abstraction. We reason whenever we subject our views to critical scrutiny in light of evidence and arguments that may come from any source. Discussion with others, the gathering and sharing of evidence and arguments about what is good and what works, lies at the heart of reason. When reason works, we say we have learned something. Practical learning is a process that moves us from less to more adequate evaluative perspectives.

Sen’s arguments for the universal value of democracy can be cast in terms of such rational learning processes. Sen argues that democracy (1) embodies, (2) promotes, and (3) is the object (conclusion) of processes of practical reason or learning. Since such processes move us to what we judge to be more adequate evaluative perspectives, we all have reason to embrace them. Democracy is therefore a universal value. Consider each of these arguments.

Democracy as an embodiment of collective practical reason

Democratic theory is largely divided between two conceptions of democracy: aggregative and deliberative. According to the more familiar aggregative conceptions, democracy is majority rule. This conception stresses voting as the core institution of democracy, and represents voting as a mechanism for aggregating given individual preferences. Arguments for this conception of democracy try to show that the aggregation mechanism of majority rule is more likely to maximally satisfy people’s preferences than alternative aggregation rules. This conception of democracy fits with the welfarist tradition of economics, elaborated in social choice theory, to which Sen made significant contributions earlier in his career (Amartya Sen 1970). However, Sen has rejected the idea that social institutions are to be evaluated solely according to their contributions to human welfare. Other values, such as freedom and respect for rights, matter too (Sen 1999b: 62). Sen’s work has come to stress a more deliberative conception of democracy.

According to deliberative conceptions, democracy is government by discussion among equals (John Dewey 1927; Jürgen Habermas 1996; Iris Young 2000). This conception stresses the universal accessibility of a state’s permanent residents to equal citizenship, freedom of speech, assembly, and the press, and mechanisms for holding public officials accountable for their
actions (including not just periodic elections, but the right to petition, transparency of public dealings, and the rule of law) as the core institutions of democracy. These institutions enable collective deliberation, feedback mechanisms informing democratic bodies about the performance of their policies as judged by the public, and opportunities for changing these policies in light of that feedback. This view departs from the welfarist view of democracy as a static mechanism for aggregating given individual preferences into a social decision. Instead, it regards democracy as a dynamic institution for collectively experimenting with different public policies that enables citizens to learn what joint goals make sense for them and how best to achieve them. Learning from experience, trying out different policies to see what works, and acting in accordance with discussions and deliberations about how to live together, are all paradigmatic exercises of practical reason. Democracy, then, is the institutional embodiment of practical reason for a collective agency composed of equal citizens.

Amartya Sen’s (1999a) instrumental defense of the universal value of democracy fits into this picture. On this defense, democracy is instrumentally valuable for the ways it promotes government responsiveness to the people’s needs. We have seen, in the case of famines above, that such promotion requires that states be capable of learning from their mistakes. Democratic states are superior to authoritarian states in this regard, because they embody an experimentalist rather than a dogmatic structure. Sen’s arguments about famine thus vindicate the experimentalist defense of democracy, put forward most vigorously by John Dewey (1927).

Democracy as promoting practical reason

Sen also defends democracy—a practice not confined to official state action, but including public discussions among ordinary citizens in civil society—for its constructive role in helping citizens learn about better values or ways of life. “The practice of democracy gives citizens an opportunity to learn from one another” (Sen 1999a: 10). Democratic discussion plays a transformative role insofar as citizens need to work out, through discussion, a common framework of reasons through which to discuss state policies. “Even the idea of ‘needs’ … requires public discussion and exchange of information, views, and analyses. In this sense, democracy has constructive importance” (Sen 1999a: 10). Public discussion can also change people’s perceptions of what is feasible, especially by expanding possibilities for collective action. It can therefore play a role in changing individuals’ preferences that have been adapted to deprivation and a sense of resignation or inevitability (Sen 1999a: 11). For example, if a democratic state, responding to public demands for gender justice, starts promoting women’s access to health services, this can have a transformative effect on
individual women’s desires. Once women no longer perceive women’s lesser access to healthcare as “normal,” they may no longer adapt their desires to this condition.

**Democracy as the conclusion of practical reason**

Suppose two people disagree about the value of something. Suppose also that neither side’s advocacy is rooted in internal inconsistency or error, relative to their background beliefs. Then both people are making a *positionally objective* judgment – a judgment that is warranted *relative* to their position. If each side stands fast, the disagreement will persist. But suppose there is a path from one position to the other that is reasonably described as a process of *learning*: of grasping an alternative previously unimagined, discovering its feasibility, trying it out and finding it more satisfactory than what one did before, recognizing that certain bad outcomes were caused by the alternative one had originally endorsed, or that certain good outcomes are caused by the new alternative, that disaster will not befall those who choose the new (notwithstanding earlier fears), and so forth. If there is such a path, this gives us reason to believe that the position at its end point provides a superior evaluative perspective to the other, which in turn gives us a reason to move to that position. If all learning paths ultimately lead to this position, that would vindicate its claim to universal value.

Sen claims something like this dynamic on behalf of democracy. The decisive feature of the twentieth century has been the spread of democracy (Sen 1999a: 3). This by itself is not vindicating, since it could have spread for reasons other than learning of its superiority to alternatives. What is vindicating is the fact that once people have enjoyed democracy they don’t want to go back. Even in the poorest countries, attempts to repress democratic civil rights are met with outrage and, if it has not been made too dangerous, protests (Sen 1999b: 151 – 2). Of course, democracies have been crushed through force. But this is no argument for the rational superiority of authoritarianism, since force is not a learning process. And the twentieth century has witnessed reversals, of which Weimar Germany is perhaps the most notorious. But no informed person doubts that the Germans made a serious mistake in choosing Nazism over democracy. That the spread of democracy, and people’s support for it, are arguably the result of learning is powerful evidence of its universal superiority to the other types of regime tried thus far.

The more complex challenge that Sen has to meet concerns cases of democratic failure in which (unlike in the case of Weimar Germany) both the masses and the elite appear willing to give democracy a serious try. When military takeovers of democratically elected regimes are welcomed by substantial numbers of their inhabitants, as has happened in states such as Turkey and Pakistan, this calls Sen’s unidirectional narrative into question.
To meet the challenge posed by such potential counter-examples, Sen needs to argue that the failures in question are due either to factors beyond the control of any type of regime, but misattributed to democracy, or to a failure to fully implement democracy. The latter possibility—that some failures of democratic regimes could be due to their not being democratic enough—deserves further exploration, as attempted below.

V. IMPROVING DEMOCRACY: ENHANCING THE REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN

Many democracies have failed to correct chronic capability deprivations in substantial subsets of their populations. I have argued that the informational approach to analyzing institutions helps us understand why this is so. To count as fully democratic, state policies must be constructed from the critical interactions of the local perspectives of citizens from all social positions. If citizens in certain social positions—for example, women, the poor, lower castes—chronically suffer from significant capability deprivations, this is evidence that their perspectives have not been heard or taken seriously in the deliberations that shape public policies. Capability deprivations may, of course, cause such failures as well, through adaptation of preferences to deprivation, a lack of freedom and resources to participate in public discussion, and status demotion, whereby the privileged take deprivation as a sign that the disadvantaged are not worth listening to. To correct these problems, steps need to be taken to ensure that members of disadvantaged groups are heard. In a context of global gender inequality, this supports the call by many feminists to adopt policies to increase the representation of women in democratic offices, especially legislative bodies.

Several countries have heeded this call. Political parties in the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, and Germany have adopted this idea. In Norway, for example, the Labor Party requires that 40 percent of its candidates in local and national elections be women (Anne Phillips 1993: 98). Such policies have dramatically increased the representation of women in the Nordic countries, which boast representative assemblies that are one-third or more female (Anne Phillips 1995: 59). Other countries have institutionalized gender quotas through national legislation. Argentina requires political parties to place women in 30 percent of the electable positions on their party lists for its national deputies (Mark Jones 1996). France has adopted a law requiring 50 percent of party lists for local political offices to be female (Suzanne Daley 2001). In India, 33 percent of local government seats are reserved for women. This has brought 1 million Indian women into local government (Margaret Alva 2001). This is an important step forward, although of course, as discussed in Elizabeth Anderson (1995), simply ensuring the presence of subordinated group
members in representative assemblies does not ensure that their views will be taken seriously. 3

Arguments over the proper composition of representative bodies reproduce in political form the two approaches—subsumption/abstraction, and pragmatic—epistemic—to dealing with positional differences that were introduced at the beginning of this paper. According to the first strategy, positional differences are causes of bias and intolerable conflict that can be avoided only by adopting a global point of view that abstracts from these differences. Abstraction requires the state to not recognize certain positional information among citizens, such as their religion, race, ethnicity, and gender. The state should be “color-blind,” “gender-blind,” and so forth: it should ignore the social composition of the formulators and beneficiaries of state policies, so long as they are produced by procedures that do not explicitly discriminate between citizens on the basis of their social locations. This is supposed to ensure equal and impartial treatment of citizens.

Against this, critics argue that in practice, given the structural inequalities that disadvantage women, a policy of gender-blindness is biased in favor of the interests and perspectives of men. Without policies to increase women’s representation, politics-as-usual will effectively preclude women from getting access to political offices. This will mean that their voices are not heard in legislative deliberations, and that their interests and perspectives will be ignored. Parallel arguments have been advanced by proponents of group-specific representation for ethnic and religious minorities. However, two distinct perspectives underwrite such arguments. Calls for the specific representation of ethnic and religious minorities usually reflect a politics of identity, based on ascriptive identification. Feminist calls for increasing the representation of women primarily reflect the pragmatic—epistemological perspective that has been the focus of this paper. Amartya Sen’s ethics help us distinguish and evaluate the two perspectives.

Consider first the perspective of identity politics. On this view, most modern states are composed of separate ethnic or religious groups whose members have a primary stake in preserving their relatively parochial ascriptive identities. These identities are held together by common practices and parochial affiliations, which generate claims on the central government for a devolution of power to ethnic—religious groups, to enable self-determination in matters affecting their group identities (Will Kymlicka 1995; Bhikhu Parekh 1998). The resulting forms of government include both full-blown “consociational” democracy and the more limited communal self-government. In the former, separate religious, ethnic, or linguistic communities enjoy proportional group representation in legislative bodies, proportional division of public funds, and a veto power over policies particularly affecting their groups (as in the case of Belgium’s pre-1993 constitution, dividing power between Flemish- and French-
speaking communities at the national level: Arend Lijphart 1977). The more limited forms are observed today in Israel and India, where distinct systems of family law are administered by the different religious bodies. Identity politics resists the project of constructing more global, cosmopolitan, trans-group perspectives.

Sen has much to say against ethno-religious identity politics, drawing on his experience of the partition of India and Pakistan, which was achieved at the cost of mass displacement and bloodshed. Sen lays the blame for this on the promulgation by partitionists of a faulty conception of ethno-religious identity as singular, exclusive, and given. Singularity ignored the fact that individuals occupy multiple positions, not just as Hindus or Muslims but as members of cross-cutting associations such as neighborhoods, schools, and firms. Exclusivity fetishized difference through definition-by-contrast, whereby one defines one’s own identity in terms of putative contrasts with an outgroup. This process ignored the commonalities of groups and perversely denied the possibility of practical identification in collective agencies, despite long histories of peaceful cooperation between Hindus and Muslims in India. Givenness ignored the fact that separatists chose to adopt an exclusionist identity and assign it supreme authority. The divisive politics of pre-partition India did not passively reflect but rather caused “the massive identity shift” by which Amartya Sen (1998: 20) argues:

... people’s identities as Indians, as Asians, or as members of the human race seemed to give way—quite suddenly—to sectarian identification with Hindu, Muslim, or Sikh communities. The broadly Indian of January was rapidly and unquestioningly transformed into the narrowly Hindu or finely Muslim of March. The carnage that followed had much to do with unreasoned herd behavior by which people, as it were, ‘discovered’ their new divisive and belligerent identities, and failed to subject the process to critical examination.

This was a failure of “reasoned humanity” (Amartya Sen 2000a: 37). By this, I think he means not simply that the identities adopted licensed cruelty to others, but that they precluded identification as, and with, humanity as such, as well as with other practical identities that included both Hindus and Muslims. Thus, Sen’s fundamental objection to identity politics is not that it necessarily leads to violence—although this is a lamentably common outcome—but that it imposes arbitrary obstacles to expanding the scope of cooperation through practical identification.

Identity politics, as Sen understands it, is premised on skepticism about the possibility and desirability of constructing trans-group practical identities and evaluative perspectives. The skepticism may be justified under certain conditions—for example, when subordinated groups have no realistic hope of being justly treated in a governing association including their dominators. In such cases, the best feasible solution may be
separation, or else consociational democracy, as a last-ditch attempt to avoid the violence and turmoil that separation would bring about. Sen worries, however, that resigning to separate, mistrustful identities can be a self-fulfilling prophecy, entrenching suboptimal parochial self-understandings.

By contrast, the pragmatic—epistemological approach to the variety of evaluative perspectives recognizes that we can have compelling reasons, based on sympathy, respect, and more cosmopolitan practical identities, to govern our assessments and actions for certain purposes on more global perspectives. Concern for the representation of disadvantaged groups in more cosmopolitan decision-making bodies arises not from a desire to reinforce parochial group identities as ends in themselves, but from a desire to construct a more global perspective that can validly claim to pay due regard to the interests and perspectives of all.

The key idea of the pragmatic—epistemological approach is that more global, more objective perspectives arise through the critical interaction of positional differences (Longino 1993; Harding 1993). Legitimate deliberation in democratic institutions therefore requires the effective participation of those whose perspectives reflect positional differences. On this approach, calls to enhance the presence of women and members of other disadvantaged groups in representative bodies are meant to improve the quality of democratic deliberation (Phillips 1995; Jane Mansbridge 1999; Melissa Williams 1999; Young 2000).

This argument for increasing the representation of disadvantaged groups contrasts with both identity politics and the subsumption/abstraction strategy for dealing with positional differences. Against identity politics, feminist deliberative democracy presupposes the possibility and necessity of cross-group sympathy: enhanced representation of disadvantaged groups won’t improve collective deliberation unless “we listen sympathetically to another’s claim that our practices treat them unjustly” (Williams 1999: 67). Against the subsumption/abstraction strategy, feminist deliberative democracy rejects the thought that representatives do or ought to participate in deliberation only as undifferentiated citizens, as if their social identities, as defined by structural inequalities, did not matter to what they say (Iris Young 1990: 116–121; Williams 1999: 67). It is also skeptical of the tendency of deliberative democrats following the abstraction strategy, such as Habermas (1996), to sharply separate “ideal” deliberation—in which arguments should be assessed and accepted apart from considerations of interest—and appeals to particular interests. Where certain groups are unjustly disfavored, they need to be able to complain that the system specifically works against their interests.

Feminist advocates of the pragmatic—epistemic strategy for justifying increased representation of disadvantaged groups have been sensitive to the objection that such policies might inflame a divisive politics of identity.
In particular, they have acknowledged the dangers of promoting a false group essentialism that purports to define groups in terms of common traits (Phillips 1995: 166; Mansbridge 1999: 637–9). The groups whose representation they think needs to be enhanced are defined rather by the disadvantages produced by their external social relations (Melissa Williams 1998: 15–18). Some argue that group essentialism and identity-freezing can best be avoided by policies that enhance the presence of disadvantaged groups in representative bodies through indirect or less formal means (Mansbridge 1999: 652–3; Young 2000: 149–52).

It remains a delicate matter to explain how representatives from disadvantaged groups should conceive of their role. Should they see themselves as specifically representing the disadvantaged groups to which they belong? The diffidence of some feminists on this score reflects difficulties with the idea of group representation. Anne Phillips (1993; 1995: 54–5), who has considered this problem most deeply, argues that female representatives cannot be said to represent women as a group unless they are accountable to women as a group. Such accountability would be possible only if women were organized as a distinctive electoral body, such that women alone would vote for female representatives. Iris Young (1990: 43, 183–91) at one time advocated such a model of group representation, in conjunction with a conception of social groups that mixed desires for ingroup affiliation (based on ascriptive identification) with a more structural account of group differences.4

Such a model, in focusing citizens’ minds on their own ascriptive group identities, fails to consider how this form of identification affects the way others identify themselves. If women representatives are publicly understood as speaking by and for women as a group, how is the public supposed to understand what male representatives are doing? If women specifically represent women, then it would seem to leave male representatives the job of specifically representing men. One could reply that this is what male politicians have been doing all along, implicitly—which is why women are needed in office in the first place. This reply fails to consider the ominous implications of converting a regrettable fact into a norm. It is one thing to critically observe that male representatives have a sorry record of neglecting women’s interests. It is quite another to insist that, lacking ascriptive identification with women, they cannot represent women. For if ascriptive identification is the basis of competent representation, then male politicians can only represent men, and it must be their job to do so. The implications of imposing this self-understanding on men can only be to excuse them for their neglect of women’s interests, and to pitch men’s and women’s interests in competition with each other. This cannot be good for women.

To avoid this, one could argue that while it is all right for oppressed groups to act especially on behalf of their group, it is not all right for
dominant groups to act especially on behalf of their groups. They must consider only the general interest of society, without favoring one group over another. This proposal, however, reproduces the sexist association of men with the universal and women with the particular on the basis of which men have traditionally claimed superiority. And it raises the question: if men already have access to a universal perspective, inclusive of women’s interests, why do we need special representation for women’s local perspective? A politics based on the solidarities of ascriptive identification with women leaves men with no good place to stand, from a feminist perspective.

Sen’s reflections on positionality, universality, and democracy offer a different way to understand the point of reserving political offices for women, in terms of the pragmatic-epistemological strategy. Consider two cases of the differences women have made to politics, which have been made possible by the reservation of office. Indian observers have remarked that women representatives have focused local government energies on the previously neglected areas of safe drinking water and sanitation, in contrast to the traditional focus of men on building roads and municipal buildings (Vasantha Surya 1999; Staff Reporter, The Hindu 2000; Alva 2001). As one observer explains, “the kitchen and the latrine continue to occupy the old, old space, they are where women and the lowest class of dalits have to function,” so it is no surprise that “most men just do not share or care” about the inadequate facilities in these spaces, and that women were needed to mobilize improvements in these areas (Surya 1999). In Norway, feminist politicians have set their sights on a more ambitious agenda of transforming men’s identities. Feminism is not just about raising the consciousness of women, but of recruiting men into the movement for gender equality, in part by expanding their opportunities to share in childrearing. Women politicians have led successful efforts to reserve four weeks of a family’s paid parental leave for the father, an action that increased men’s use of parental leave to a stunning 70 percent by 1995 (Murray Lundberg 2001). Norwegian feminists have also ended the default practice of awarding child custody to the mother in cases of divorce, so as to give divorced men a chance to continue involved relationships with their children.

On the pragmatic-epistemological model, deliberative democracy is a means of mobilizing local positional knowledge for shared ends. The improvements witnessed in India due to the inclusion of women in local politics reflect this mobilization. Inclusion enables democracy to utilize the local knowledge that women are more likely to have in virtue of the gendered division of labor. The Indian women bring their knowledge to local government in the expectation that they can persuade men to share their concerns. Their quest is not for validation of their parochial positionality as particular, but to offer up their perspective as universal, as
properly shared by all. The Norwegian feminists agree. As mothers, most have experienced the joys of childrearing. But instead of celebrating the perspectives this activity generates as specifically feminine, and supposing that these perspectives are women’s special preserve, they want, in the name of gender equality, to expand access to these joys and these perspectives to men. This is represented as a gain for people generally. When men come to see themselves as responsible for rearing children, it is easier for all to see that rearing children is a human function, not just a female function. What begins as highly positional knowledge can become more global, as more people find compelling reasons to share that position.

The same lesson applies even to cases in which the knowledge that women bring to deliberation includes the ways women are unjustly disadvantaged by their group position, and thereby have conflicts of interest with those who benefit from their disadvantage. It is tempting to represent such cases as ones in which women are specifically representing women, rather than acting on behalf of the “common good” of all citizens. But even here, this knowledge is deployed in the name of the common good of justice. It appeals to others’ desire to be just, although it is typically accompanied by appeal to others’ desires to avoid the costs of social conflict (Williams 1999: 69–70).

Thus, the fundamental political significance of positionality – of parochial social identity – is epistemological, and not a matter of parochial solidarity. Sen (2000b: 29) urges us to accept the same lesson:

In sympathizing with others, there are two quite different uses of identity: an “epistemic” use, in trying to know what others feel and what they see by placing oneself in the position of others, and an “ethical” use, in counting them as if they were the same as oneself. The epistemic use of identity is inescapably important, since our knowledge of other people’s minds has to be derivative, in one way or another, on our placing ourselves in the position of others. But the ethical use of identity may be far from obligatory. To respond to the interests of others, we can see ourselves as “impartial spectators,” as Smith described the role; but this demand of impartial concern is not the same thing as promoting the interests of others on the ground that they are, in some sense, extensions of oneself. As people capable of abstraction and reasoning, we should be able to respond humanely to the predicaments of others who are different and are seen to be different.

To put the point another way, the fundamental point of seeking a gender-integrated representative body is not so that women can represent women’s interests, and men men’s interests. It is that only through a representative body of men and women working together can we have a democracy able to adequately serve the interests of all its people.
In conclusion, the epistemological themes in Sen’s explorations of variations in people’s ethical judgments are complimentary to feminist work. Where traditional approaches to objectivity presume that variations in judgments fundamentally reflect error and bias, Sen, like feminists, has construed such variations as potential resources for constructing more objective points of view. In both Sen’s work and in much feminist work, democracy provides the key to transforming differences from biases into resources.

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NOTES

1 Elizabeth Anderson (2002) surveys the different ways feminist theorists deal with the influences of social position on people’s points of view.

2 I defend these claims, and explore further the connections between the normative validity of perspectives and their factual presuppositions, in Elizabeth Anderson (1998).

3 For example, subordinates may have difficulty getting access to the floor, speaking without interruption, and obtaining a respectful and accurate hearing. The same stigmatizing representations of subordinates’ supposed group characteristics that are used to justify their subordination may also lead hearers to systematically distort or discount what members of subordinated groups say (as when women expressing their grievances are dismissed as hysterical). Internalized norms of deference to dominant groups may also make it difficult for representatives of subordinate groups to find their own voices. I discuss these problems and some approaches to dealing with them in Elizabeth Anderson (1995).

4 She has since withdrawn the suggestion, without, however, fully divesting herself from the ingroup affiliation model (Young 2000: 149–52, 216–17).

REFERENCES


ARTICLES


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